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STATUS

TRANSSEXUAL'S CAPACITY TO MARRY

CONSTITUTIONAL

analysis of the right to marry' continued to

be implemented with further comment on the standing of unisexual unions 2 and the inclination of a few sister-states to give the
practice statutory status.3 A related dispute was before the San Antonio
1. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Supreme Court's Impact on Marriage, 1967-1990, 41

How. L.J. 271 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to

Marry, 1790-1990, 41 How. L.J. 289 (1998).
2. See Jill R. Green, Comment, Will the Marriage of Dick and Jane Evolve into the
Marriage of Jane and Jane? Same-Sex Marriage: A Viable Union in the 21st Century, 45
Loy. L. REV. 313 (1999); Bryan H. Wildenthal, To Say "1 Do": Shahar v. Bowers, SameSex Marriage, and Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381 (1998).
3. See HAW. REV. STA. ANN. ch. 572(c) (Reciprocal Beneficiaries) (Michie 1999).

This statute allows persons not allowed to marry to qualify for the benefits of marriage by
registration, but the statute seems to presuppose sexual relations between them because a
brother and sister, and presumably a grandparent and a grandchild, are excluded from its
benefits, though as interdependants they might be reasonably included. See also VT. STAT.

ANN. tit. 23 § 1201 (2000) (Civil Union) (unisexual monogamous relationship statute); tit.
25 § 1301 (2000) (Reciprocal Beneficiaries Relationship) (blood or adoptive relations with

presupposition of sexual relations). See also proposed legislation in Colorado concerning
reciprocal beneficiaries and civil unions.
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Court of Appeals in Littleton v. Prange.4 The plaintiff in this wrongful
death action was born a male in 1952 (apparently in Texas) and at the age
of twenty-three underwent gender-dysphoria surgery and psychological
treatment (also referred to as sexual reassignment) by which he became a
female transsexual. In 1989 the plaintiff and a biological male were ceremonially married in Kentucky, where persons of the same sex may not
marry. 5 The two lived together thereafter as husband and wife until the
man's death, though their domicile is not commented on in the report.
As the man's surviving spouse the transsexual then brought suit in Texas
for the man's wrongful death. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff, as a male, was not the decedent's
surviving spouse under the Texas statute. 6 During the pendency of this
suit, in a ministerial proceeding in another Texas court, the plaintiff's
birth certificate had been amended at the plaintiff's request to show
change of sex and name under the Texas statute allowing such change if
the original record was "incomplete or proved by satisfactory evidence to
be inaccurate." '7 The defendant's motion for summary judgment was
nonetheless granted, and the plaintiff appealed. By a majority of two to
one the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In the
absence of statutory guidance the court relied on biological factors to determine that the plaintiff was, and is, a male as a matter of law 8 and hence
was unable to have been married to the decedent under Texas law. 9 Justice Alma L6pez dissented on the ground of the significant evidence of
the plaintiff as female that had raised an issue of material fact in that
regard. 10 Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Hardberger said that the
amendment of the birth certificate was of no effect 1 because the certificate was not "inaccurate" within the meaning of the statute at the date of
the plaintiff's birth. The dissenting judge thought that the amended cer2
tificate had replaced the original certificate as a matter of law.'
B.

INFORMAL MARRIAGE

Although informal marriage is now recognized in only eleven American jurisdictions, 13 many states nonetheless continue to recognize significant elements of the doctrine as exceptions to their prevailing
4. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
5. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020(1)(d) (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
6. See TEX. C1v. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.004, 71.021 (Vernon 1977).
7. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 191.028 (Vernon 1992).
8. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226-31, 231-32 (relying on In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d
6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Probate Ct. 1987), and Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E. R. 33, 1970 WL
29661 (P. 1970)).
9. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 1998).
10. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 232.
11. See id. at 231. Angelini, J.,
concurring, did not mention this point.
12. See id. at 233. Cf. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976),
noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 31 Sw. L.J. 105 (1977).
13. See John B. Crowley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-Law Marriage:A Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine, 29 CUMB. L.
REV. 399, 400 note 4 (1999). An institution that prevailed throughout Christendom before

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

requirements of ceremonial marriage. 14 After an ill-considered effort to
eradicate the doctrine in Texas in 1989, the principle of informal marriage
has been largely restored to its prior form by legislation and judicial decisions. The shifting rules of law were commented on in Nava v. Reddy
Partnership/QuailChase.15 The wrongful death of the alleged husband
occurred on February 1, 1994, and the alleged widow filed her application
for consequential Social Security benefits in March, 1994. It was not until
April, 1995, however, that she filed her suit to determine her status as his
widow, and it was not until August, 1995 that she filed suit for her alleged
husband's wrongful death. From 1989 until amended in 1995 the Family
Code provided in section 1.91(b) that a proceeding in which an informal
marriage is to be proved "must be commenced not later than one year
after the date on which the relationship ended .

,"16 The Houston First

District Court of Appeals held that the alleged widow's marital status
under the statute had been timely asserted by her claim for Social Security benefits.

17

First amended as section 1.91(b) in 1995 and then recodified as section
2.401(b) in 1997,18 the statute now requires that the survivor of an alleged
informal marriage must assert the claim within two years of the date the
parties ceased living together or it is "rebuttably presumed" that the parties did not agree to be married informally. As the law stood prior to the
1987 amendment, there was no statutory presumption as to the parties'
agreement. While an agreement could be inferred from the facts of holding out and spousal cohabitation, the burden of proof, nevertheless, was
on the proponent of the informal marriage to prove all of its elements.
Thus, though the standard of proof for an informal marriage has been
somewhat raised, the law virtually returned to it former condition after a
decade.

19

C.

PRIVILEGED TESTIMONY

To encourage harmony in marital relations the spousal-communication
privilege allows exclusion of evidence of a spouse or former spouse of a
person accused of a criminal offense. In Huddleston v. State20 the husband-father, who was prosecuted for aggravated kidnapping and aggrathe mid-sixteenth century can scarcely be said to have been "on honeymoon" either before
or after that time.
14. See id. at 412-15, 418-24.
15. 988 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
16. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
17. See Nava, 988 S.W.2d at 349-50.
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 1998). For a brief review of the fluctuating
statutory time limitations see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 52
SMU L. REV. 1143, 1146 (1999).
19. See Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 933-34 (Tex. 1993). See also Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161 (1994).
20. 997 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In McCuller v.
State, 999 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.), a prosecution of the husband for
endangering the health of his wife and thus an interspousal offense, did not implicate the
spousal privilege.
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vated sexual assault on a minor, sought to exclude the testimony of his
wife. Though neither the accused nor his wife was the parent of the minor victim, the privilege is nonetheless inapplicable to such testimony
privilege
under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because it, like the
21
in the federal context, applies to utterances rather than acts.
In United States v. Martinez,22 a mother was accused of abusing her
own minor children. Allowing her ex-husband (the father of the children) to be called as a witness for the prosecution, the court said that
"[s]ociety has a stronger interest in protecting such children than in preserving marital autonomy and privacy."'2 3 In this case, moreover, there
was very little harmony or trust in the former marital relationship to preserve. The federal district court therefore followed precedent from other
exception to the
federal circuits and Texas law in enunciating a further
24
involved.
are
minors
when
rule
spousal privilege
D.

STATE EMPLOYMENT

Entering an affidavit (allegedly pursuant to Water Code section 54.118)
to memorialize her intent to abstain from further participation in the hiring of her husband to the paid position of utility superintendent did not
insulate a member of a county municipal utility board from the board's
action. The member signed the affidavit on an evening in early 1995
when (but possibly after) the board of a county municipal utility district
had appointed her husband to the paid position. 25 The provision was of
the Water Code repealed in 1995.26 In September, 1999, after the resignation of that board member, the board sought the Attorney General's
opinion with respect to any such appointment that might arise in the future. Stating the general rule 27 that a public officer is prohibited from
29
hiring a near relative 28 for a paid public position, the Attorney General
30
added that the offence is punishable by a fine as well as removal from
office. 31 Nor did the board member's affidavit under former section
54.118 make the particular appointment exempt from the provisions of
21. See Huddleston, 997 S.W.2d at 321; TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.10 (Vernon
Supp. 2000).
22. 44 F. Supp.2d 835 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
23. Id. at 837.
24. See id. at 836-37.
25. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 54.118 (Vernon 1994), repealed by Act of May 25,
1995, ch. 715, 843, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3803, allowed a board member to make an affidavit
showing the intention of the board member not to participate in any vote dealing specifically with an existing employee who was the board member's relative, and the board member's relative was allowed to maintain existing employment.
26. See id.
27. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.041 (Vernon 1994).
28. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.002 (Vernon 1994); within the third degree of
consanguinity, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.023 (Vernon 1994); or within the second degree of affinity, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.025 (Vernon 1994). With respect to the
former, see Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0185 (2000).
29. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0184 (2000).
30. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.084 (Vernon 1994).

31. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.081 (Vernon 1994).
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the Government Code, which under certain circumstances allowed an appointee to retain an existing position 32 though the board-member-relative
may not participate in a decision affecting specifics of his employment.
Strengthening this position, the Attorney General pointed out further
that "a director of a municipal utility district may not participate in a vote
on a matter involving a business entity or real property if he or she has a
substantial interest in the matter and it is reasonably foreseeable that action on the matter would confer an economic benefit on the business entity or real property. '33
E.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION UNDER

ERISA

In a Louisiana case 34 the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a non-pensioner's claim to a community portion of an ERISA-controlled pension interest 35 left undivided on divorce must be claimed
before the ex-spouse-pensioner retires. This result, however, was not
based on Boggs v. Boggs,36 which dealt with the terminable interest rule,
but merely on terms of the federal statute. 37 In the Louisiana case, the
former spouses divorced in 1972, before much judicial experience in division of pension interests existed and nearly twelve years before the Retirement Equity Act of 198438 instituted the qualified domestic relations
order (QDRO) as the orderly means of dealing with the entitlement of a
non-pensioners to a pensioner's benefits. 39 After his 1972 divorce the
pensioner remarried, retired in 1983, and died in 1993. It was not until
1997 that the ex-wife sought a QDRO in a Louisiana court to establish
her interest. Her suit was removed to federal district court. Following
the approach of the Fourth Circuit,4 0 the Fifth Circuit concluded that at
the pensioner's retirement his benefits irrevocably vested in his second
wife under the federal statute.4 ' His former wife was therefore barred
from any interest in the plan. 42 Thus a sort of terminable interest rule
32. See TEX. GoV'r CoDE ANN. § 573.062(a)(2)(A) (Vernon 1994). See Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. LO 95-015 (1995), commented on in Joseph W. MeKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, 49 SMU L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1996).
33. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0184 (2000) at 3.
34. See Rivers v. Central and South West Corp., 186 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 1999).
35. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1999)).
36. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
37. For a Texas case dealing with claims of spouses as employees of their own closely
held corporation against insurers under an ERISA-regulated health benefits plan, see Vega
v. National Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In Matassarin v.
Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 564 (5th Cir. 1999), the court rejected an ex-wife's alleged ERISA
entitlement to the appreciated value of shares held in an ESOP at the date of delivery of
the interest segregated to her on divorce, rather than the value of the shares plus simple
interest as provided in the QDRO made pursuant to a 1991 divorce.
38. 26 U.S.C. § 417 (1984).
39. See Carla M. Oliveira, The Many Applications of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, 32 FAM. L.Q. 641 (1998).
40. See Hopkins v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 105 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 1997).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
42. See Rivers, 186 F.3d at 683-84.
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against the non-pensioner arose on the date of the pensioner's
retirement.
In Barnett v. Barnett,4 3 however, the Houston First District Court of
Appeals declined to find any application of the federal statute to a case in
which a prospective pensioner's widow sought her community interest in
proceeds of life insurance when the premiums were paid with payroll deductions from her husband's ERISA-regulated retirement plan. Prior to
the husband's death, his wife had sued him for divorce; he then evidently
made his estate the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds and executed a
will naming his mother as executrix. By his will the husband made the
insurance proceeds payable to named beneficiaries of his estate in specified amounts with the largest sum payable to his mother. Applying Texas
law of estate administration, the court concluded that ERISA does not
purport to affect the pensioner's estate." On this point Justice Mirabal
dissented, arguing that "the ERISA plan documents direct[ed] that proceeds of plan life insurance policies [be] payable to the beneficiary designated by the employee. ' 45 The only such designation was the decedent's
direction of payment of the insurance proceeds to his estate with actual
beneficial designation spelled out in his will. The dissenting interpretation of such designations as by "ERISA plan documents" (and thus as
necessarily controlled by federal statute) is therefore strained.
F.

SPOUSAL CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS

1. Loss of Consortium
In Brewerton v. Dalrymple46 the Supreme Court of Texas reiterated the
well established principle that a spouse's action for loss of consortium is
derivative.4 7 Thus, when the husband failed to sustain his claim for
wrongful dismissal from employment, his wife's derivative claim also
failed. 4 8 In Verinakis v. Medical Profiles, Inc.4 9 went further in stressing
that for a spouse's action for loss of consortium derived from a primary
claim for infliction of emotional distress, the primary claim must be sup50
ported by the other spouse's recovery for serious physical injury.
43. 985 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
44. For a further discussion on the reimbursement issue raised in Barnett, see infra at
text accompanying notes 169-70.
45. Id. at 535.
46. 997 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999).
47. See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ard, 991 S.W.2d 518, 526-27 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.) (a premises liability case largely concerned with weight of
evidence); North Am. Refractory Co. v. Easter, 988 S.W.2d 904, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1999, no pet.) (a products liability case applying Alabama law); Ross v. Boodry, 54
F. Supp.2d 1199 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (spouse of non-seafarer can recover for loss of consortium for non-seafarer spouse's injuries in boating accident in territorial waters).
48. See Brewerton, 997 S.W.2d at 217.
49. 987 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (O'Neil, J. dissenting) (agreeing with the trial court that the infliction of emotional distress was intentional).
50. See id. at 99.
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Malpractice Claim

In Arlitt v. Paterson5' the widow of a deceased testator brought suit for
professional malpractice against the attorneys representing both of them
in preparing a joint estate plan 52 and representing the testator in preparing his will. The widow sued in her representative capacity as executrix of
the will, in her individual capacity as a beneficiary, and in her individual
capacity as a party to the contract of professional employment. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court sustained the trial court's ruling as to the widow's claim on
behalf of the decedent's estate because the attorneys did not represent
her in her representative capacity, 53 quite apart from the lack of an assertion that the decedent had suffered any damage during his lifetime. 54 In
reliance on Barcelo v. Elliott,55 the court stated that as a mere beneficiary
of her husband's will, the plaintiff could not recover on a professional
malpractice claim because such a claim depends on privity of contract. If
she could show privity of contract with the defendants, however, individual standing to sue existed. 56 The appellate court also sustained the
widow's standing to sue for negligent misrepresentation, which does not
require privity of contract for its assertion. 57 Likewise, privity requirements do not exist in causes for damages for expenditure of attorney's
58
fees and for costs in her will contest and will-construction proceedings.
In Douglas v. Delp59 spouses sued their former attorneys for malpractice resulting in various sorts of economic loss: the husband's loss of interest in property, earning capacity, credit reputation, and for mental
anguish and the wife's pain and suffering (mental anguish, stress, and depression) and community interest in her husband's losses. The Supreme
Court of Texas held that the husband (whose cause of action had passed
to his trustee in bankruptcy 60) lacked standing to sue for mental anguish
because his losses were purely economic, and that the wife's separate
cause of action for mental distress could not be maintained in the absence
of heightened culpability on the part of the attorneys (i.e. "egregious or
extraordinary circumstances" 61) which had not been proved. The wife's
"claim for mental anguish damages [was merely] a consequence of her
51. 995 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
52. There was no intimation that the wills were mutual, and they do not appear to
have been joint. But neither fact would have made a significant difference in the result.
53. See id. at 720.
54. See id.
55. 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996).
56. See Arlitt, 995 S.W.2d at 720-21.
57. See id. at 718.
58. See id. at 721.
59. 987 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1999). In another suit by a husband and wife against their
attorneys for malpractice, the court in Brents v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 10 S.W.3d 772,

775-78 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.), concluded that the plaintiff's cause of action had
been barred by the statute of limitation which had begun to run and was not tolled
thereafter.
60. See Douglas, 987 S.W.2d at 882.
61. Id. at 884.
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,,62 Evieconomic loss [and as such] she may not maintain that claim .
dently it was the lack of physical loss in regard to the husband as well as
the wife that barred recovery for emotional distress under the facts of the
case. By "egregious circumstances" the court apparently meant more
than merely "conscience-shocking facts," no matter how disreputable.
Presumably the court referred to a kind of behavior definable in terms of
norms of recovery, such as representations affecting change of status concerning the nature or condition of property, or including enticement to
commit a fraud or crime.
G.

SPOUSAL CLAIMS AGAINST EACH OTHER

1. Emotional Distress
The Texas Supreme Court had decided Schlueter v. Schlueter63 two
months before hearing argument in Douglas v. Delp64 (an action by
spouses against their lawyers) and while a petition for a writ of error in
Vickery and Richards v. Vickery 65 was awaiting consideration by the
court, as noted in Justice Hecht's dissenting opinion in Schlueter.66 In
Schlueter, the majority of the court, speaking through Justice Raul Gonzalez, held that in a suit for divorce one spouse could not recover damages against the other for fraudulently secreting community funds in
anticipation of divorce. 67 The court noted, however, that in the division
of the community estate a divorce court may award a money judgment to
one spouse against the other for various causes that may include the
wrongful removal of community property before trial. The court added:
"Because the amount of the judgment is directly referable to a specific
value of lost community property, it will never exceed the total value of
the community estate."' 68 Justice Hecht (joined by Chief Justice Phillips)
dissented on the ground that "the [Court's] only rationale for treating
fraud on a spouse differently from other intentional torts is that fraud
does not involve personal injuries."' 69 Though the course of legal development since the late 1970s has hitherto moved toward recognition of
general tortious recovery between spouses, it would be more consistent
62. Id. at 885. Further, the court held that "[a]ssuming that a representation, as that
term is used in the [Deceptive Trade Practices Act,] could be inferred from [the attorney's]
advice to sign the [settlement] agreement, a general misrepresentation that the agreement
would protect the [clients'] interest is too vague under the facts of this case to support
DTPA liability." Id. at 886.
63. 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998).
64. 987 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1999).
65. 42 TEX. Sup. Cr. J. 670 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997 pet. denied).
66. 975 S.W.2d at 591 n.6.
67. Id. at 586-88.
68. Id. at 588. The court cited Mazique v. Mazique, 742 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1987, no writ), and might have added Reaney v. Reaney, 505
S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
69. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 590. Justice Spector dissented on grounds that had been
disposed of in Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). See Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, 39 Sw. L.J. 1, 8-11 (1985).
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with traditional tenets of Texas marital law to treat all claims between
spouses as in the nature of reimbursement claims.
In anticipation of divorce, the husband in Schlueter had hidden $12,500
in his father's care. During the course of the proceeding the funds were
recovered. In Vickery, on the other hand, the lawyer-husband had contrived to rid himself of his wife by convincing her to sue him for a divorce
as a means of saving their community estate threatened by a ruinous malpractice suit about to be brought by one of his clients. 70 The client had
indeed threatened suit, but by the time that the lawyer finally convinced
his wife to sue for divorce, the matter was secretly settled. The husband
then arranged for an old friend to act as his wife's lawyer while also acting on his behalf. After having rid himself of his wife, the lawyer
promptly married his ex-wife's former best friend and then sought to enforce his property rights under the divorce decree against his ex-wife. It
was then that the ex-wife procured counsel of her own choosing to bring a
successful bill of review against her husband and her lawyer. Her efforts
prevailed before the trial court and the First District Court of Appeals,
and the ex-husband sought review before the Supreme Court.
When the other members of the Texas Supreme Court denied the husband's petition for review of the lower court's decision in Vickery and
Richards v. Vickery,71 Justice Hecht alone dissented to the court's failure
to grant review and attached the lower court's opinion to his dissent as an
appendix. 72 Although the court's refusal to grant review was not accompanied with an opinion, some of the justices may have regarded their position as having been adequately expressed in Douglas v. Delp. Thus, for
them, the egregious circumstances of fraud in Vickery supported the
award of damages for the ex-wife's emotional distress against her lawyerhusband. In his dissent Justice Hecht explained that "[a]pplying Schlueter
could require that the actual and punitive damages awarded to Mrs. Vickery against her former husband be reversed.. ." and that on remand the
trial court could then "consider Mr. Vickery's 'dishonesty of purpose or
intent to deceive' and 'the heightened culpability of actual fraud' . . . .73
Justice Hecht recognized that under Schlueter "the court may not simply
divide the community estate to award Mrs. Vickery damages she cannot
otherwise recover, but it also need not to measure her share by the damages she ha[d] suffered. ' 74 In light of Justice Hankinson's carefully
crafted opinion in Douglas, in which Justice Hecht joined, the majority of
the court evidently concluded in denying review in Vickery that the divorce court's award to the wife amounted to a division of the community
70. Whether the wife realized that the husband's proposal that his wife sue him for a
divorce to be followed by later reunion smacked loudly of a plan to defraud anticipated
judgment creditors does not appear from the report. See Steed v. Bost, 602 S.W.2d 385
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
71. 42 TEX. SuP. Cr. J. 652, 999 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1999).
72. 999 S.W.2d at 345.
73. Id. at 344.
74. Id. at 344-45.
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estate in her favor along with a money judgment against her husband that
was within the dimensions of their community estate. Review of the record presumably supported the conclusion that the heightened culpability
of the husband and the wife's attorney allowed damages to be awarded
against both of them under Douglas. It should also be noted that the
conduct of both the lawyer-husband 75 and the wife's counsel 76 were the
subject of professional discipline.
Mayes v. Stewart77 rests on facts similar to those of Schlueter (where the
husband had secreted funds with his father to be returned after the divorce), except that the plan to defraud the wife was not detected in Mayes
until several years after the divorce. In 1993 the husband and wife were
separated. The wife was living in New York and the husband was living
with his mistress in Texas. The husband bought a lottery ticket which
entitled him to 3.5 million dollars to be paid in annual installments over
twenty years. Disinclined to share his winnings with his wife, the husband
agreed with his mistress that she would claim the winnings, but the husband could spend them as he pleased. The husband then brought suit for
divorce, and he and the woman (who was not a party to the suit) testified
that the lottery ticket and the winnings belonged to her, and the court so
found. In dividing the community estate, the court merely allowed each
spouse to take the property in his or her possession or control. In 1993
and 1994 the installments of the lottery winnings were received and used
by the ex-husband, but in 1995 the former mistress (since married to the
ex-husband) sold three years of installments at a discount. In 1996, she
attempted to sell another three years of installments, but her husband
intervened to abort the sale. Evidently by then more inclined to share his
winnings with his former wife, the ex-husband told her of the plot, and
she sued him and his present wife in another court for fraud, conspiracy
and partition of the lottery winnings. The husband then asserted a claim
against his mistress, who also asserted a claim against him. 78 In the exwife's suit a jury rendered a verdict in her favor against both her ex-husband and his present wife and awarded the ex-wife the value of one half
of the lottery winnings. The jury made no findings in favor of the exhusband or his wife and awarded $20 in damages against the latter and
$50,000 against the ex-husband. The wife alone appealed.
The appellant asserted that the ex-wife's proper remedy was a bill of
review in the divorce court to set aside the divorce and argued that without setting aside the prior judgment, res judicata barred the ex-wife's
claim. She thus argued that the ex-wife was bound by the divorce court's
division of the community property. 79 The appellate court might have
75. See Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
76. See Disciplinary Actions, 62 TEx. B. J. 295, 297 (No. 3, 1999).
77. 11 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
78. The husband had since pled guilty to a charge of aggravated perjury as to the
ownership of the lottery ticket in the divorce proceeding.
79. See id. at 448.
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analogized the divorce court's award of community property "in possession or in control" to decrees under which retirement benefits are not
covered by such language. 80 Instead, the court merely accepted the res
judicata argument and demonstrated its inapplicability. There was no
provision in the divorce decree in favor of the appellant and thus her ownership of the winnings was not res judicata. 8 1 Hence, the ex-wife's failure
to follow the jurisdictional rule for an equitable bill of review was not
controlling.
II.

CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A.

PRE-MARITAL ACQUISITIONS

Murray82

In In re
the court concluded that non-marital standards of
acquisition (that is "general property law") governs title on pre-marital
acquisition of property by a man and woman who subsequently marry
rather than the rules applicable to acquisitions by spouses. 83 In that case,
application of general law to the facts indicated acquisition in equal
shares and was therefore shared equally as separate property. 84 A recital
in the couple's pre-marital agreement may recognize the constitutional
quality of separate property but a provision to protect the continuing separate character of property already owned or claimed by a spouse-to-be
constitutes a statutory rather than a constitutional element of the agreement. 85 Thus, no partition or exchange need support the recital. Separate character of the property is already in place by operation of law.
Such a recital, however, often supported by schedules of existing property, is a useful means of identifying such property in case of future dispute. Such pre-marital understandings have been used in Texas since the
mid-nineteenth century without any need for constitutional
authorization.
In Smith v. Smith86 the appellate court concluded that the trial court
erred in mischaracterizing the husband's separate property as community
property and remanded the case to the trial court for division of the community estate. Prior to marriage, the husband had brought suit for damages suffered in connection with a purchase of real property. The dispute
went to trial after the couple married. The judgment totaled $256,000, of
which $95,000 covered attorney's fees. This sum was therefore held by
the separate and community estates, as a tenancy in common from which
the attorney's fees were properly shared pro-rata. 87 The net recovery after the payment of these fees was thus $161,000. Of this sum $110,000
was attributable to the husband's direct and consequential damages (sepSoto v. Soto, 936 S.W.2d 338, 343 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
See Mayes, 11 S.W.3d at 449-50.
15 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
See id. at 205.
See id. at 205-06.
85. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.003(a)(1) (Vernon 1998).
86. 22 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 2, 1999, no pet.).
87. See id. at 46.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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arate property) and $52,000 for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest
(community property).
All the recovery for the husband's claim had been deposited in an account subject to his sole management and after a number of withdrawals
contained about $100,000 at the time of divorce. 88 The court treated all
of these withdrawals as from the community portion of the funds on deposit before depleting any of their separate property. This application of
the well-known "community-out-first" principle, 89 identified inaccurately
as stemming from the decision in Sibley v. Sibley,90 all the community
property deposited in the account prior to the divorce having been depleted. 91 Thus, the trial court's award of the residue of the account to the
92
wife was erroneous.
In the 1999 amendments to the Family Code the legislature added a
provision that codifies the rule in Love v. Robertson93 that a tenancy-incommon may exist between separate and community property. 94 That
situation is illustrated by the judgment for pre-marital personal injury
with interest in Smith v. Smith. 95 Prior to a marriage a person is not then
a husband or a wife. Thus, any acquisition then made retains its character
as non-marital and any replacement of a pre-marital asset by judgment
takes the same character, but interest earned on such assets during marriage is community property.
An award by a divorce court to persons who later remarry is separate
property of the recipient as a pre-marital acquisition. That point was at
issue in In re Taylor.96 Similarly a transfer made by one spouse-to-be to
the other future spouse is also a pre-marital acquisition to which marital
presumptions are inapplicable. But if the transfer was a fraudulent one in
that its object was to defraud the transferor's creditor (in order to protect
the property from a lien that might be fixed on it by the transferor's creditor), any promise by the transferee to reconvey the property at some
later time is unenforceable. 97 The marital status of the parties at the time
of the transfer is irrelevant as to the application of that rule.9 8
88. Id.
89. See id. at 147.

90. 286 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ dism'd w.o.j.), commented on in
Smith, 22 S.W.3d at 147 n.5. See Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 52
SMU L. REV. 1143, 1154-56 (1999).

91. Smith, 22 S.W.3d at 147.
92. Id.
93. 7 Tex. 6, 8 (1851). §3.006(a) describes this condition in its caption as a "proportional ownership of property."
94. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.006(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
95. No. 14-96-01080-CV, 1999 WL at *2.
96. 992 S.W.2d 616, 618-20 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
97. See In re Parker, 997 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
98. For examples of fraudulent interspousal transfers and the application of the rule,
see JOSEPH W. McKNIGHT & WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
LAW

ch. 5 at 12 (2d ed. 1998).
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ACQUISITIONS MADE DURING MARRIAGE

1. Gifts
Although property was received by a spouse during marriage with a
recital of value for which the property was transferred in the formal instrument of transfer, evidence of gift can refute the recital and will rebut
the community presumption so that the property is proved to be the receiving spouse's separate property. Thus, it was shown in Rusk v. Rusk99
that stock of an operating corporation was received by the husband-son
from his father as the husband's separate property' 0 0 despite a finding of
the trial court that the stock was community property.
In In re Morris'0 ' the court dealt with several instances of presumed
interspousal gifts. During marriage, and using his separate funds, the
husband had bought a lot on which to build a house. The lot was conveyed to both spouses thus raising a presumption of a gift of one-half of
the property to the wife.' 02 The presumption of gift as to one-half therefore prevailed in the absence of any refutation by the husband though the
trial court had erroneously awarded the entire property to the wife. During the marriage another piece of land was purchased by the husband and
also paid for with his separate property. At purchase this property was
also put in the names of both spouses, but in this instance the husband
testified that he had put his wife's name on the deed in the interest of
marital harmony and that he did not intend to give her an interest in the
property. 0 3 The trial court did not find his testimony convincing but nev04
ertheless erroneously awarded all of that property to the husband.'
During marriage the wife in Roberts v. Roberts0 5 conveyed to her husband a one-half interest in a home she had acquired prior to marriage but
without any recital in the deed characterizing his interest in the property.
The divorce court ordered the home sold and the proceeds divided. In
remanding the division of the property the appellate court properly applied the presumption of gift' 0 6 but went on to rely on Bohn v. Bohn 0 7 to
fix heavy burdens of proof on a recipient husband to show that the gift
was "fair and reasonable and voluntarily and understandingly made."
One would have thought that at this late date such a double standard is
99. 5 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)
100. See id. at 303-05. Fowler, J.dissenting. See id. at 310-12.
101. 12 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
102. See id. at 881 (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975);
Graham v. Graham, 836 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ)).
103. Morris, 12 S.W.3d at 883.
104. See id. at 883-84.

105. 999 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.).
106. See id. at 432 (citing Story v. Marshall, 24 Tex. 305 (1859) (conveyance of community property by husband to wife)). See also Goldberg v. Zellner, 235 S.W. 870 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1921, judgm't adopted) (conveyance of separate property by husband to
wife).
107. 455 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ dism'd), discussed in
Joseph W. McKnight & Louise Ballerstedt Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas

Law, 25 Sw. L. J.34, 39-40 (1971).
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pass6 as Justice Reavley characterized disparate treatment of interspousal
gifts in his dissent in Cockerham v. Cockerham.1° 8
2.

Tracing

In McCann v. McCann'0 9 the issue before the court was not the application of the reimbursement principle but the characterization of the reimbursement claim. The land on which improvements were made during
marriage was acquired by the husband prior to marriage. The case was
tried to a jury and over 100 questions were submitted to the jury on the
character and values of the properties in issue. The jury found that the
particular property was partly separate and partly community. The court
granted the husband's motion to disregard that finding and awarded the
property to him as his separate estate, as it obviously was.' 1 0 The court
went on to find that substantial improvements were made to the property
at community expense and awarded the wife one-half that amount. The
husband appealed on the characterization of the reimbursement claim.
The court first concluded that the burden of rebutting the community
presumption that improvements put on the property during marriage
were supplied by the community estate was on the separate property
claimant. But the court was satisfied that the husband had proved that all
but $37,261 of expenditures for improvements came from his separate
funds. Thus, to that extent he had rebutted the community presumption. 1 Thus, the community estate's right of reimbursement was limited
by the degree of community expenditure and the case was remanded for
new division.
In Evans v. Evans"12 the spouses' home was purchased during their
marriage, destroyed by fire, and rebuilt with the proceeds of an insurance
policy purchased during the marriage. Though the husband merely
claimed a right to some separate property reimbursement against the
house, the divorce court characterized all of the house as his separate
property and awarded it to him. The trial court's conclusion (however
explained) clearly went beyond any proper application of judicial discretion, and it was necessary that the appellate court remand the case for a
1 3
new division of the community estate.
3.

Borrowed Money

Money borrowed during marriage is presumed to be community property unless the lender looks only to the separate estate of the borrower
108. 527 S.W.2d 162, 175 (Tex. 1975).
109. No. 14-97-01339-CV, 2000 WL 280301 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 16,
2000) (not designated for publication).

110. Id. at *1.
111. Id. at *2.
112. 14 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

113. Id. at 347-48.
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for repayment.' 14 In Sprick v. Sprick1 5 the wife in a suit for divorce
sought to show that money ostensibly borrowed by the husband was not
really borrowed, or, if a loan was made, it was negotiated fraudulently by
the husband in an effort to diminish the net community estate. The trial
court found that the loan transaction had occurred and was not fraudulent, and the record did not provide grounds for the appellate court to
disturb the trial court's finding. The burden was on the wife to prove her
allegation of fraud or to establish her assertion that the lender looked
only to her husband's separate income for repayment, and on both points
116
she had failed in making her proof.
4. Personal Injury Recovery
Section 3.003 of the Family Code, 117 as interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court in Graham v. Franco,"8 defines as separate property the
recovery for a personal injury claim except compensation for lost earning
power and medical expenses incurred by the community estate. In Staton
v. Staton 1 9 the divorcing couple had sued during marriage for damages
resulting from a medical malpractice claim for injury to the wife and loss
of consortium by the husband. A lump sum settlement for the claim was
reached without any specific attribution of damages. But the trial court
had rejected the husband's separate property claim for loss of consortium
as unsupported by his evidence, and there was no evidence that he had
suffered physical injury or monetary loss. The trial court therefore held
that the wife had satisfied her burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence that a specific amount of the recovery (after deducting stipulated medical expenses and lost wages) was her separate property consisting of her claims for disfigurement, pain and suffering, and mental
anguish. 120 Without discussion the court rejected the husband's argument
that the income from the settlement agreement was merely contractual
and hence community property. It was presumptively community property, but by using the husband's stipulation, the wife had successfully
traced her separate property losses to their source.
In Licata v. Licata12' the court again concluded in a suit for divorce
that the wife had sufficiently identified her recovery from a personal injury action to prove its separate character. It is not indicated in the opinion, however, when the wife's injury occurred or when the settlement for
her recovery was reached, but both events presumably occurred shortly
before the suit for divorce was filed. The wife (perhaps joined by her
114. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
115. No. 08-98-00035-CV, 1999 WL 420987 (Tex. App.- El Paso June 24, 1999, no
pet.)(not designated for publication).
116. Id. at *4, *5.
117. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003 (Vernon 1998).
118. 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).
119. 987 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
120. Id. at 183, 184, citing Lewis v. Lewis, 944 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. 1997), where a
similar statement is made in the court's preliminary analysis.
121. 11 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
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husband) 12 2 had sued for the wife's pain and suffering and physical disfigurement. In the settlement only the wife released the defendant from
liability for her injuries and both spouses executed an individual agreement to hold the defendant harmless for any further medical expenses
incurred. The wife was then paid a lump sum excluding fees and expenses. 123 The wife then deposited the funds in a brokerage account in
her name. On these facts the court held that the wife had discharged her
burden of proof to rebut the community presumption and to show that
the entire recovery was her separate property. This showing might not
satisfy everyone's conception of clear and convincing proof, but it was
enough for the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals. The court added
somewhat imprecisely and casually that the "clear statements in the settlement documents displaced the presumption of community property
and created a new presumption that the settlement proceeds [were the
wife's] separate property" 12 4 and had thus shifted the burden of proof to
the husband. The husband countered with evidence of his joinder in the
indemnity agreement, by which he presumably meant to show that they
had jointly procured the settlement. This suggestion, the court said in
reliance on Staton,12 5 was insufficient to overcome the prima facie case
already established by the wife. 126 The indemnity agreement in which the
husband had joined was certainly consistent with the wife's position, and
the husband's further argument as to bargain was worthy of his professional standing as a lawyer. The court rejected his argument with the
wife as
curious comment that the settlement funds were received by the1 27
arise.
could
indemnity
of
right
any
before
property
separate
her
5. Stock Options
The wife in Charrierev. Charriere12 8 had acquired options to purchase
shares in her employer's corporation when it was purchased by another
corporation. The options were exercisable at any time but with the corporation's consent (though these restrictions expired over time). During
the marriage the wife had both exercised and sold some of these stock
options. At the time of divorce the wife had a large number of stock
options and the court divided them equally between the spouses as community property. The wife argued that the options were somehow her
122. Whether both spouses had sued was not clear from the record. Id. at 274.
123. No document introduced by the wife in the divorce proceeding indicated that medical expenses were included in her personal injury recovery. Id. at 275.
124. Id.
125. Staton, 987 S.W.2d at 182-84.
126. Licata, 11 S.W.3d at 274-75.
127. Id. at 276. The ingenuity of the husband's argument in this instance must have
been somewhat dimmed by the court's having to deal with his assertion that an unsigned
worksheet indicating that his wife might have received community worker's compensation
benefits for various fees and expenses from an insurance company as part of the proceeds
of the settlement. At the trial of the divorce case the wife testified that she had received
no compensation for loss of wages. The husband's point was apparently to suggest ambiguity inthe settlement agreement which on its face was clear.
128. 7 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
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separate property and that the fact that their value depended on her postdivorce employment by the corporation affected their characterization.
The appellate court rejected her first argument on the ground that all the
options were received (and in fact exercisable) during marriage. 12 9 The
appellate court also rejected the wife's argument that the value of the
options affected their characterization. Though the court acknowledged
that in maintaining the value of the shares the transfer restrictions on the
shares might be onerous to her, value of the shares does not affect their
character in this respect. 130 The court also rejected the wife's analogies of
stock options to professional goodwill and professional degrees' 3' as well
132
as to retirement benefits.
6. Spouse's Retirement Pension Trust of Separate Property (but Not
Productive of Income which Settlor-Spouse Can Reach) Converted
to an ERISA-Governed Plan
In Lipsey v. Lipsey133 the husband was a settlor of a trust prior to marriage. The income from the trust corpus was payable to him at the sole
discretion of the trustee and no income was ever distributed. During
marriage the husband exercised his right to convert the trust into an ERISA-governed pension plan. His wife brought suit for divorce and asserted that she was therefore a beneficiary of the plan because the
conversion constituted a constructive distribution of trust income which
was therefore community property by virtue of ERISA's QDRO provisions. But ERISA's QDRO provisions do not create community property
interests. They merely make it possible for division of personal earnings
from an ERISA-regulated trust. The court concluded that growth of the
trust corpus does not constitute personal earnings, and the fact that a
trust may allow the spouse-settlor to convert it into an ERISA plan does
not make any trust fund distributable and thus community property.
7. Defined Contribution Retirement Plan
In Smith v. Smith 134 the court reiterated the proposition that in calcu129. Id. at 219-221 (citing Bodin v. Bodin, 955 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1997, no pet.) (unvested stock options), and Demler v. Demler, 836 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (presumptively community stock options)).
130. Id. at 221. Of course if some stock options were attributable to the pre-marital
employment and were therefore separate property, their value (as expressed in terms of a
right to purchase shares at a cost below market value) would be a relevant factor in determining this character. For handling valuation in other jurisdictions, see Lynn Curtis, Comment, Valuation of Stock Options in Dividing Marital Property Upon Dissolution, 15 J. of
AAML 411 (1998).
131. Id. at n.7.
132. Id. at 221-22. For treatment of valuation of stock options in other jurisdictions see
Lawrence D. Dodds & Robert D. Feder, Stock Options in Divorce -A National Trend, 13
AM. J. FAM. L. 105 (1999).
133. 983 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). This case is discussed in a
different context in Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 52 SMU L. REv. 1143, 1159 (1999).
134. 22 S.W.3d 140, 149-50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
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lating the value of separate and community components of a defined contribution retirement fund the court may merely subtract the value of the
135
fund at the beginning of the marriage from that at the end.
C.

RECOVERY FOR SPOUSAL DESTRUCTION OF INSURED INTEREST IN
COMMUNITY PROPERTY

In 1977 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the condition of Texas
family law had so changed that the concept of interspousal immunity
claims arising from willful injury of one spouse by the other spouse was
no longer a bar to recovery for the loss. 1 36 Thus, unauthorized disposition or destruction of one spouse's separate interest in property by the
other spouse might be actionable but not necessarily subject to the same
rules as applicable between non-spouses. An innocent wife has since
been allowed to recover on a contract of insurance for the destruction of
her separate property interest co-owned with a separate property interest
of her husband and destroyed by him. 137 The court, however, reserved
consideration of the consequences of a claim for destruction of a spousal
half-interest in community property. 138 After the federal appellate court
had abstained from dealing with that question, 139 the issue was finally
resolved by the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v.
Murphy. 140 In that case prior to their divorce the spouses had made an
equal partition of whatever interest they had under a contract insuring
their community property that had been destroyed by the willful act of
the husband. After their divorce the ex-wife asserted a right against the
insurer to recover for her destroyed one-half interest. Although the insurance policy contained a clause barring recovery for fraud and misrepresentation in asserting facts of a claim, and the claim had been filed
without revealing the husband's part in the destruction of the property,
the insurer waived that contractual defense and chose to rely on the husband's wrongful act as a bar to recovery. The ex-wife, in turn, relied on
the spousal partition as the basis for her recovery for one-half the loss.
Though at least seven members of the court evidently agreed that the ex135. See Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas

Law, 51 SMU L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1998).
136. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
137. Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1986).
Some of the developments over the first decade of appellate consideration of these matters
are briefly reviewed in Joseph W. McKnight , Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 19-21 (1987).
138. Kulubis, 706 S.W.2d at 955.
139. Norman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 804 F.2d 1365, 1366 (5th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam), commented on in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 SMU L. REV. 1, 20 (1987). The court reiterated that
conclusion in Webster v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 953 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1992),
discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1475, 1488 (1993).
140. 996 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1999).
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wife could assert her claim based on the partition,' 4 ' only six members of
the court allowed the ex-wife to recover against the insurance company
apparently on the principle of common half-ownership, evidently rejecting any argument (that might have been made) based on her right of
reimbursement from her ex-husband.142 Two judges dissented" 43 on the
ground that when the right of recovery arose it was a community right
and to allow any recovery would thus recognize the arsonist husband's
right to benefit by his own wrong.' 44 Though the six members of the
majority of the court speaking through Justice Alberto Gonzales limited
the ex-wife's right of recovery to one-half of the value of the community
property destroyed, her interest in the property depended not on the voluntary spousal partition but apparently on her vested half-ownership
right. Alternatively it might have been said that the husband had lost his
half-interest by his own willful act of destruction, as was his apparent intent, leaving only the wife's interest surviving under the contract. But
however the interspousal equities may be weighed, the insured ex-husband lost his one half of the value of the property destroyed due to his
wrongful act. It remains to be seen whether insurers will seek to change
this result by tightening the terms of their policies to exclude any recovery in such cases. Such uncertainty aside, the court's reliance on the simple principle of community half-ownership as the basis for the wife's
recovery invites a similar approach to a claim for a spouse's own lost
earnings due to personal injury that have been barred by the wrongful
participation of the other spouse in the cause of injury.
III.

CONTROL OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A.

REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS

1. Support Obligations Arising Prior to Marriage
Does a continuing pre-marital personal obligation to support one's minor child give rise to a right of reimbursement (against the separate estate
of the parent) if community funds of a later marriage are expended for
that purpose? In Farish v. Farish145 the court concluded that the husband's obligation to support his minor children of his first marriage indeed arose prior to his second marriage. But the court went on to say
that the responsibility to discharge that obligation continued during the
subsequent marriage and thus it became a community obligation. But
such an analysis can be made of any undischarged premarital obligation
146
and is supported by the language of Family Code section 3.202(c),
141. See id. at 882 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
142. That argument, advanced in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. Rev. 1475, 1488 (1993), can fall afoul of the
contractual terms of the policy, but such terms were not relied on by the insurer in
Murphy.

143. Murphy, 996 S.W.2d at 883 (Enoch and Owen, JJ. dissenting).
144. Id.

145. 982 S.W.2d 623, 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
146. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(c) (Vernon 1998).
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which provides that a creditor may enforce a pre-marital obligation
against the separate property of the obligor or community property subject to a debtor spouse's sole or joint management at the option of the
creditor. Thus, because liability for child-support is a community obligation as well as a separate obligation, the concept of spousal liability (obligation) is easily confounded with that of property interest
(characterization). Just as in Norris v. Vaughan 147 the court confused
principles of liability with characterization of property interests. The
right of reimbursement asserted may merely require attention to primary
148
over secondary responsibility as between the spouses.
Fixing liability from a creditor's point of view need not resolve the issue of competing spousal interests. In Norris v. Vaughan in 1953 the
court denied reimbursement to a husband-father's separate estate for
providing familial support, which is ordinarily thought of as a community
property responsibility. The result was explained on the basis of liability.
If the separate property of the father-obligor and the community estate
are both liable, as they are for family necessaries, no right of reimbursement was said to be due to the husband's separate estate that discharged
the obligation. A further factor in the court's thinking may have been
that the husband had voluntarily paid for familial support, but voluntary
payment has never been a defense to a reimbursement claim in Texas.
If a duty to support a child of a prior marriage is equated to the duty to
provide familial support (as that obligation was treated in Norris v.
Vaughan) and the community estate discharges that obligation (as occurred in Farish), why would liability not fall primarily on the father's
separate estate as the debt had its origin in the pre-marital past? The
principle of correlative liability which seemingly protected the community estate from supplying reimbursement in Norris v. Vaughan would not
be operative. But, particular circumstances of the dispute in issue might
overcome an argument based on primary responsibility.
In Lewis v. Lewis,149 also before the First District appellate court in
Houston, the wife alleged that the husband had used community funds to
pay contractual alimony to his prior wife, certainly a legitimate ground
for a reimbursement claim by the community estate. But the husband
showed certain offsetting income tax benefits that the community estate
enjoyed from his separate business transactions. Thus, the trial court's
failure to award reimbursement to the wife was within the proper exer147. 152 Tex. 491, 502-03, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953). For other comments on the conclusion see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 39 Sw. L. J. 1, 10 (1985), and Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L. J. 1, 15 (1989).
148. For other discussions of a right of reimbursement of the community estate for support of a child of a prior marriage or a child born out of wedlock see Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51 SMU L. REV. 1047, 10591060 (1998); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 52 SMU L. REV. 1143, 1161 (1999).
149. No. 01-98-00354-CV, 1999 WL 442176 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 1, 1999,
no pet.) (not designated for publication).

1016

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

cise of the trial court's good judgment and application of equitable
principles.
2.

Claims for Enhancement in Value

In In re Morris150 the couple had built a house on a lot held by them in
equal shares as separate property. Separate funds of both spouses as well
as community funds were used to make improvements. In such a situation the separate estates and the community estate may assert claims for
reimbursement, but the appellate court's observations in this regard may
be somewhat misleading. The court said that "a trial court's discretion in
evaluating a claim for reimbursement is as broad as that discretion exercised by a trial court in making a just and proper division of the community estate."' 5 1 That statement is apt to be misunderstood. A divorce
court may indeed divide a community reimbursement right as it deems
just and the process of determining the extent of that right also involves
an element of equitable judgment in considering the circumstances under
which the claim for reimbursement arose, but the standards of judgment
in each instance depend on different sorts of factors. Further, the court
did not mention a possible right of separate reimbursement which may be
asserted by one separate estate against another. In making findings concerning rights of reimbursements a court should first determine the existence of the right (either as a separate right or a community right) and
then the court will consider the just division of the community right. The
court went on to say that "a court's finding can support reimbursement to
the community estate, as long as the spouse who is claiming the right to
reimbursement establishes the fact and the amount of community funds
' 52
expended to improve or benefit the other spouse's separate estate.'
This analysis does not reflect the full adjudicative process. In a situation
such as that in Morris the community claim may be asserted by one or
both spouses or by neither, but such a claim as may be proved will be an
equal obligation of both separate estates when they own the benefited
property in equal separate shares. Separate claims for reimbursement
will also be equally apportioned as offsets in value.
Because there were four parcels of real estate in Morris with which the
trial court had to deal (as well as the terms of pre-marital agreement of
which the court had to be mindful), the task of resolving the claims and
then dealing with division of the community rights of reimbursement was
particularly onerous and required remand to the trial court for resolution.
Rusk v. Rusk 153 also presented a reimbursement claim based on the use
of community funds to make mortgage payments on the husband's separate realty in which the couple lived during a part of the marriage and
150. 12 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.)
151. Id. at 882.
152. Id.
153. 5 S.W.3d 299, 309-10 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Fowler, J.
dissenting, considered the point at id. at 315-16.
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rented to tenants thereafter. The court approached the claim for reimbursement of funds paid to discharge the mortgage in the same manner as
the Texas Supreme Court applied the rule for funds used in making improvements in Anderson v. Gilliland.154 But the husband complained
that the trial court had nonetheless failed to give consideration to the
family use and community rental income from the property. The majority of the court apparently concluded that those factors should be considered on remand.
Though the procedural posture of Fazakerly v. Fazakerly155 is difficult
to comprehend and the holding is not altogether clear, insofar as the decision enunciates any principle of law with respect to pre-marital partitions,
nothing significant is said there with respect to that subject.' 56 The premarital partition is merely part of the background for the reimbursement
claims later asserted. At the insistence of the husband-to-be an agreement was entered into prior to the couple's marriage. Whether the husband (whose legal training long preceded the 1980 amendment to article
XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution) actually drafted the agreement
is not disclosed. The agreement first recited that each spouse would continue to hold all property owned prior to marriage as separate property157
a truism by operation of law that requires no agreement to make it sO.
The agreement went on to state that the business income of the wife-tobe would be her separate property15 8-a unilateral term that on the basis
of the facts given by the appellate court seems void on its face as neither a
partition nor an exchange under article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution. 159 But this point was not noted by the court. Although the appellate court appears to have treated the recital in the pre-marital
agreement that the husband was fully aware of the wife's financial condition as evidence of the truth of that statement, the relevance of that conclusion was not explained in that the issue of its unconscionability was not
reached by the trial court.
During the marriage, the wife's business interests were apparently
wholly regenerated with the husband's assistance, and at the time of his
death in 1992, the value of her business interests had greatly increased.
The really significant fact, however, was that after the husband's death his
daughter entered into a settlement agreement with the widow concerning
the husband's estate. Although the occasion for the settlement and the
full terms of that agreement are not related in the opinion, the daughter
154. 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985).
155. 996 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.).
156. For some useful general comments on drafting premarital agreements see Peggy L.
Podell, Before Your Client Says "I Do" - PremaritalAgreements Will Hold Up Better With
Full FinancialDisclosure, A.B.A. J. 80 (Aug. 1999).
157. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 and TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001(l). See also text
accompanying notes 80-82.
158. Fazakerly, 996 S.W.2d at 262.
159. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. See Hibbler v. Knight, 735 S.W.2d 924, 926-27 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family
Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L. J. 1, 8-11 (1988).
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agreed that the settlement might be used as a defense to any claim she
might later assert against the widow. Her claim was not asserted until
over five years later, when the daughter filed suit to establish that the
pre-marital agreement was void and that her father's estate was entitled
to substantial reimbursement for his labor in making the wife's business
interests more valuable. The wife asserted that the four years statute of
limitation 160 had run after the lapse of one year after the husband's
death, as provided by statute. 16 1 The trial court thereupon struck the
daughter's pleading and entered judgment in favor of the widow. The
appellate court sustained the trial court's judgment on appeal-first by
application of the statute of limitation to the claim and secondly on the
ground of laches, though the court did not relate how the wife had relied
on the settlement to her detriment. The daughter's claim for reimbursement was precluded by the running of the statute of limitation but even if
it were not, it should have been barred by her settlement agreement.
In 1999 the Legislature undertook to improve the rules of marital reimbursement. The new provisions of section 3.401 (Enhancement in Value
Due to Financial Contribution of Community Property) deal with community reimbursement claims for enhancement of community
62
property.'
(a) The enhancement in value during a marriage of separate property owned by a spouse due to financial contributions made with
community property creates an equitable interest of community
property in the separate property.
(b) The equitable interest created under this section is measured by
the net amount of the enhancement in value of the separate property
during the marriage due to the financial contribution made with
community property.
Applying the provisions of section 3.401 to the facts of Morris and Rusk
present no particular difficulties. The community contributions were
clearly of a "financial" nature. "Net amount" merely means "amount".
A similar formula in section 3.404163 describes a similar means of reckoning a separate reimbursement right for enhancement of community property and enhancement of one separate estate by another separate estate
in comparable situations. But in a situation similar to that in Fazakerly
(and in the absence of the defenses applicable there) if it had been
proved that the husband's efforts and acumen had resulted in an enhancement of the wife's separate estate, would those "contributions"
have been described as "financial?" In the history of this legislation there
is some indication that the draftsmen meant to exclude this ground for
160. TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997).
161. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.062 (Vernon 1997). See Burton v. Bell,

380 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964).
162.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.401 (Vernon 1998).

163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.404 (Vernon Supp. 2000). The denial of any claim or
setoff against one marital estate for use on occupancy of facilities of the other under
§ 3.405 simplifies the calculation of reimbursement owed but whether such denial is just in
many situations is highly questionable.
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reimbursement by use of the term "financial." But even if that was the
draftsmen's object, was that object achieved? If the contribution is in any
way measured by its effect, the result would certainly be described as
"financial."
A fundamental tenet in the application of the principle of reimbursement between marital estates is that advancements between estates do
not bear interest. But though one spouse may borrow from the community estate interest free for the benefit of a separate venture, that spouse
is required to pay for contingent enhancement of the separate estate in
the amount of the appreciation realized (equities considered) as a result
of the community investment. The same principle operates in favor of
separate property appropriated for community use and in favor of separate property of one spouse used for the benefit of the other separate
estate.
When it comes to labor, however, only the community has toil and effort to expend personally, but labor can be bought with separate funds.
Literally, the 1999 statute seems to allow reimbursement of paid separate
labor but not community personal labor. Should there be such a disparity
so that community personal labor goes uncompensated by a separate estate for enhancement of separate property? Should the separate owner
be able to expend as much of his time and energy as he wishes on his
separate estate without community compensation? Prior to the decision
of the Texas Supreme Court in Jensen v. Jensen16 4 that was the rule in
Texas. But in Jensen the court laid down the rule that a spouse is allowed
to expend unreimbursable community energy and effort only to maintain
his separate property but not to make it productive. A real problem in
applying that rule of reimbursement is evaluation of a claim such as that
advanced in Fazakerly. In Jensen on remand to the trial court that task
was ultimately put in the hands of a master to hear evidence and evaluate
the claim. In this respect it seems appropriate that such separate and
community reimbursement claims be subject to the same rules, though
the formula for calculating reimbursement as provided by the court in
Jensen has produced some puzzlement. Why, for example, did the court
direct that cash dividends paid by the husband's separate corporate interest in Jensen should be set off against a community contribution for enhancement of the value of the husband's separate corporate shares?
Those cash dividends belong to the community estate as a matter of
law. 165 (But the amount of the dividends regularly paid is certainly an
element in valuing the separate corporate enterprise and the separate
shares in that corporation.) Similarly, the value of profits retained for
expansion of the corporation and not paid as dividends is also a factor to

164. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
165. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 38 Sw. L. J. 131, 138-39 (1984).
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be evaluated. 166 In section 3.405,167 enacted in 1999, it is provided that
use or enjoyment by a claimant for benefits rendered is not to be considered in calculating a right of reimbursement against a benefited estate.
Although this sort of setoff is always difficult to evaluate, one wonders
whether its total exclusion as an equitable factor in reimbursement-evaluation can produce a fair result.
A fundamental criticism that can be made of the Jensen decision is the
court's preoccupation with what was termed inadequate compensation by
the separate corporation as a measure of the amount of reimbursement
owed to the community estate in that instance. That approach was a consequence of the pleadings and arguments in that particular case when the
question turned on whether (and to what extent) the husband had enhanced the value of the large block of separate shares of a corporation,
which he personally controlled at community expense. That was a very
difficult question that had not been fully explored at the trial. But though
the court discussed the point in terms of adequacy of the husband's compensation by the corporation, the real issue was how much benefit the
husband had contributed to the value of his separate shares as his debt to
the community was the only issue before the court not whether the corporation owed him unpaid compensation. Nor was there any issue before
the court as to whether the owners of the rest of the shares of the corporation (who had benefited by share increases as much as the husband
had) owed compensation to the community estate. Though the focus of
the 1999 legislation on "financial" as opposed to as opposed to "nonfinancial" benefits as the primary test for producing marital reimbursement rights may not be the most appropriate way to formulate the reimbursement issue, the 1999 reimbursement legislation has furnished a basis
for discussion of the resolution of this and related issues.
The 1999 legislation also distinguishes between enhancements in value
of separate property by financial contributions of community property
(section 3.401) and the use of community property to discharge a debt
"on" separate property (section 3.402168). The most common application
of this rule is found in the discharge of mortgage indebtedness on separate property with community funds. But reference to any other use of
community funds for the discharge of separate obligations is pointedly
omitted. Is section 3.402 (or section 3.401) applicable to the use of community funds to pay premiums on separate life insurance policies or to
pay any other sort of unsecured premarital obligation?

166. See Joseph W. McKnight, Reimbursementfor Uncompensated Labor Rendered for
a Closely-Held Corporationand Some Other Comments on Jensen v. Jensen, 3 THE ADVOCATE, STATE BAR [OF TEXAS] LITIGATiON SECTION REPORT
167. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.405 (Vernon Supp. 2000).

168.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 3.402 (Vernon Supp. 2000).

8 (no. 4 1984).
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Gratuitous Dispositions

In Barnett v. Barnett169 the deceased husband had two policies of life
insurance; one was his separate property and the other was community
property. The proceeds of the separate property policy passed as directed
under his will with appropriate reimbursement to the community estate
for premiums paid with community funds. In dealing with the proceeds
of a community policy of life insurance in the past, courts have applied
the standards of constructive fraud in appraising the propriety of making
the directed payments to the beneficiary, in this instance the mother of
the insured decedent. 170 Those standards include (1) the disproportionately large value of the proceeds as compared to the entire community
estate and (2) the responsibility of the deceased spouse for the care of the
beneficiary as compared to the needs of the surviving spouse. Although
his mother was a natural object of the husband's bounty in Barnett, it was
shown that she was not dependent on him for her support. On the other
hand, there was no showing of particular need on the part of his widow.
Nor was there any showing by the widow that the total disposition in
favor of the decedent's mother was unduly large in comparison with the
size of the community estate. In the absence of any further evidence in
favor of the husband's disposition of his wife's community share of the
proceeds in favor of his mother, the trial court would have been expected
to find in favor of the decedent's mother, and the trial court so ruled. The
appellate court nevertheless awarded one-half of the insurance proceeds
of approximately three-quarters of a million dollars to the widow who
had sued her husband for divorce. The appellate court seemed to approach the matter as one of presumptive community entitlement1 7' to
one-half of the community estate whereas following the trial court's exercise of its judgmental discretion is consistent with the great weight of
authority.
Evidently offended by the husband's spending of $510 on his visits to
massage parlors, the jury in Lewis v. Lewis 172 (whose advice on the issue
of reimbursement was sought by the trial judge) self-righteously awarded
the wife $100,000 in reimbursement. The trial court reduced that amount
to $50,000. In that the evidence did not support the award to more than
$510, the Houston First appellate court reformed the award to provide
169. 985 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). See text at notes 4344 supra.
170. See Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, ins ref'd n.r.e.); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d
421 (Tex, Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1966, no writ).
171. The Texas Supreme Court's apparent employment of the notion that each spouse
has a vested right to a half share of the community estate was used in a radically different
non-reimbursement context in Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, supra, note 140 at note
142.
172. No. 01-98-00354-CV, 1999 WL 442176 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 1, 1999)
(not designated for publication).
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for reimbursement of only that amount. 173 The jury had also found that
the husband had dissipated community funds by their use in paying federal income taxes of $48,000 on separate capital gains. Though the appellate court found no authority to support that award, it is hard to see why.
If the evidence had sustained the finding, reimbursement of the community estate would not have been appropriate with proper attention paid to
the equities of the situation. In affirming the trial court's handling of a
reimbursement claim for the husband's use of community funds in discharging his contractual alimony obligations to his former wife, the appellate court noted that the trial court had given weight to the community
174
benefit received as a result of the income tax payments.
Better handled instances of constructive fraud were presented in
Osuna v. Quintana.175 There the husband had maintained an affair with a
woman other than his wife for twenty-four years of his marriage, he ceremonially married the woman in 1983, and she later bore him three children, though she had known from at least 1984 that he was already
married to someone else. During their long relationship the husband had
provided community funds to purchase a home for the woman and her
children. The wife brought suit for divorce in late 1994 and joined the
husband's mistress as a party. The trial judge, sitting without a jury,
granted the divorce and made substantial monetary awards to the wife
against both the husband and the mistress. 176 As a consequence, the mistress was primarily and not merely secondarily liable to the ex-wife, at
first glance this appears contrary to the holding of the Dallas Court of
Civil Appeals in Carnes v. Meador177 that liability in such cases must be
sought first against the donor-spouse and then against the donee if it is
shown that the donor is unable to make reimbursement. In affirming the
judgment against the mistress, the appellate court deduced that in the
absence of any request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
trial court had made all necessary findings to support its judgment. Thus,
because the mistress had presented no evidence to challenge the husband's apparent inability to discharge his primary liability, the appellate
court concluded that the trial court had impliedly found that the husband
was insolvent. 178 This ingenious explanation therefore leaves the principle laid down in Carnes undisturbed. The mortgage on the house had
been long since foreclosed, and all but a small fraction of the purchase
money had been lost. 179 Despite the mistress's argument that the hus173. Id. at *2.
174. Id. at *3-*5. The opinion (not prepared for publication) is sometimes wanting in
precision on these points.

175. 993 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
176. Both the husband and the mistress appealed, but the husband's appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
177. 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. See Osuna, 993 S.W.2d at 208.
179. Although the appellate court had affirmed the wife's right to a resulting trust
against the home purchased for the mistress, id. at 210, later in its opinion the appellate
court merely alludes to a debt awarded against the husband and the mistress.
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band had promised the house as a place for their children to live, the
appellate court found therein no refutation of the principle that a resulting trust was fixed on the house in the absence of a family purpose,1 80
after the mistress had failed to cite contrary authority. 18 1 The mistress
had also argued that she should be answerable to the community estate
for only one half of the funds received. The appellate court rightly
pointed out that in a suit for divorce (unlike a death case) full, not half,
reimbursement is imposed in favor of the community estate in such instances.182 The reason for the difference in a death case is that on the
spouse-donor's death, a partition of the community has been achieved
and the decedent's share is therefore treated as a completed gift, as in
Barnett v. Barnett.183 There the court characterized a testamentary disposition of community insurance proceeds as a constructive fraud. The
widow was entitled to no more than one-half of the community proceeds
as the other one-half had passed as the husband's separate share at
4
death.18
B.

LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY

Because all of the jointly managed community property is liable for
either spouse's debts in full, such property passes to a debtor-spouse's
trustee in bankruptcy.1 85 But claims to a debtor-spouse's assets can, by
application of federal preemption principles, go well beyond Texas rules
of marital liability. The rights of the Internal Revenue Service are illustrated in In re Whitus.186 In a wife's Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding in
which her husband was not joined, the Revenue Service filed a proof of
claim for a tax penalty against the husband for failure to pay social security withholding taxes in connection with several business ventures. These
were community liabilities for which jointly managed community property is liable, and there was jointly managed community property within
the bankruptcy estate to which a tax lien could attach under federal
law. 187 The Fifth Circuit appeals court paraphrased section 101(7) of the
Bankruptcy Code: a " 'community claim'

. . .

provides creditors holding

claims against the debtor or a nondebtor the opportunity to participate in
distribution out of the bankruptcy estate, if state law would have allowed
180. See Osuna, 993 S.W.2d at 211.
181. See id. at 211.
182. See id. at 208.

183. Barnett, 985 S.W.2d at 530-31, supra note 169.
184. See id. Cf. Redfearn v. Ford, 579 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
ref'd. n.r.e.), where the wife's behavior had deprived her of an equitable share in the husband's disposition of well over one-half of community insurance proceeds to his son. Thus,

though the disposition of the donor's share was allowed to stand as the consequence of his
inter vivos directions under the insurance contract, equitable considerations also justified
reduction of the contestant's community share. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 115, 132-33 (1980).

185. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(2) (West 1993). See Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879,
883 (Tex. 1999).
186. 240 B.R. 705 (Bankr, W.D. Tex. 1999).
187. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(7), 541(a)(2) (West 1993).
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recovery from community property assets." 188 The Revenue Service
sought to share not only in the debtor's bankruptcy estate as it stood at
the beginning of the proceeding, but also in the debtor's post-petition
89
income under a Chapter 13 plan. Bankruptcy Code section 1325(a)
however, limits recovery under a Chapter 13 plan to what could be received under a Chapter 7 proceeding whereby several subestates are recognized under section 726(c)(2) for the satisfaction of claims against a
non-debtor.' 90 In this instance, because the bankrupt debtor's post-petition earnings are not available for distribution in a Chapter 7 case, they
are not available for distribution in a Chapter 13 proceeding. Further,
because the property of the debtor's estate that the Revenue Service
sought to reach was the debtor's solely managed community homestead,
which could not be liquidated in a Chapter 7 proceeding, that property
also could not be used to calculate a distribution under section
1328(a)(4).' 9 1 The court added that all "community claims" can be
treated together in a Chapter 13 plan, and thus by application of the bestinterest-of-creditors test a particular creditor may take nothing, as may
also be the result if no claimant for a community claim is favored under
192
that test.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with another instance of the
interaction of state and federal law in In re Cook. 193 The bankrupt husband and wife had incurred debts to a creditor whose security agreement
covered the proceeds of all crops planted in particular land for five years.
For their cotton crop the debtors had purchased crop insurance under the
Federal Crop Insurance Act 194 which allowed assignment, but the creditor had not been given an assignment as such. When the crop insurance
was paid for loss of the cotton crop, the debtor-husband used the proceeds to discharge other debts. In the couple's bankruptcy, the creditor
asserted a secured interest in the insurance proceeds under Texas law and
further claimed that the debtor-husband should be denied a discharge
because of his fraudulent disposition of the insurance proceeds. 95 The
court held that neither the federal act nor the federal regulations made
pursuant to it effectively preempted Texas law in requiring an assignment
except when a creditor seeks to obtain the proceeds of an insurance policy directly from the insurer. In this instance, however, as the proceeds
were paid to the debtors directly, a specific assignment of the insurance
proceeds was not necessary to protect the creditor under Texas law because the creditor had a lien on the insurance proceeds under its contract
188. Whitus, 240 B.R. at 707.
189. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (West 1993).
190. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 726(a)(2)(A) (West 1993). The first subestate favors the Revenue Service, whereas the fourth and fifth subestates are residual and may well be empty.
See Whitus, 240 B.R. at 709.
191. See Whitus, 240 B.R. at 710.
192. See id.
193. 169 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1999).
194. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1509 (West 1999); 7 C.F.R. § 401.8 (2000).
195. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(2)(A) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
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with the debtors. 196 On remand, however, the trial court must consider
whether the husband's act in paying other creditors with the insurance
197
proceeds established grounds for denial of a discharge.
C.

MANAGEMENT POWERS OF A DECEASED SPOUSE'S
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

The deceased spouse's personal representative succeeds to the decedent's powers of management for both the descendents solely controlled
community property and all of the jointly controlled community property
and responsibility for discharging liabilities on such properties. 198 Thus,
the Corpus Christi appellate court held in In re Estate of Herring'99 that
statutory authority exists for the decedent's personal representative to act
alone without the joinder of the surviving spouse as to community property that was jointly managed by the spouses during the life of the
decedent.
D.

INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFERS AFFECTING LIABILITY

In In re Wang 200 a creditor of the ex-husband asserted that a denial of
discharge was proper because the ex-husband made a fraudulent transfer
of a community truck to his estranged wife within one year of filing for
bankruptcy.20 1 Though the transfer actually occurred well outside the
one-year period prior to bankruptcy, the evidence also showed that the
transfer was made to resolve a marital dispute. The court's conclusion
implies that even if the transfer had occurred within one year of the husband's bankruptcy filing, the facts failed to show any intent to defraud the
20 2
husband's creditors.
E.

HOMESTEAD: DESIGNATION AND EXTENT

Long ago in Lauchheimer & Sons v. Saunders20 3 the Texas Supreme
Court held that nine of 109 acres in issue had been enveloped by urban
sprawl and had thus become urban. In a series of recent cases, however,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has wrestled with this question with
196. See Cook, 169 F.3d at 277. See also In re Rees, 216 B.R. 551, 554-56 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1998).

197. See Cook, 169 F.3d at 277-78. Because the wife had no involvement in these matters, the creditor had not contested her discharge. See id. at 278.
198. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 160, 177(b) (seemingly without authority of the
probate court), 355-357 (by authority of the probate court) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
199. 983 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
200. 247 B.R. 211, 213 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
201. See 11 U.S.C.A. 727(a)(2)(A) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
202. The creditor evidently did not plead that the transfer was voidable under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548 (within one year of bankruptcy) or that the debtor had made a fraudulent transfer
under Texas law, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), in which case the transfer would have been within the
Texas statute of limitation, For a brief discussion of an alleged pre-marital fraudulent
transfer, see In re Parker,supra notes 97-98.
203. 97 Tex. 137, 76 S.W. 750 (1903).
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continuing concern. In In re Moody20 4 the terrain of Galveston Island,
including the sparse habitation of the region in question, apparently
caused both the bankruptcy court and the appellate court to conclude
that urban envelopment had not occurred. The Fifth Circuit court subsequently held in both In re Bradley20 5 and In re Blakeman20 6 that land
north of Dallas and Fort Worth, respectively (though in both instances
actually within urban corporate boundaries), were rural homesteads.
Most recently in In re Crowell 20 7 that Court reexamined the problem. On
former farmland in the fast-growing area north of Dallas, a residential
subdivision of forty-two acres surrounded by other residential subdivisons was in course of development within municipal boundaries. The
debtor maintained his home in this area as the subdivision was developed. The court found that the envelopment of the area by such development decisively transformed it from a rural to an urban setting. It
interpreted this transformation in the same way the Texas Supreme Court
saw the situation in Lauchheimer& Sons v. Saunders2 0 8 in late nineteenth
century Gatesville, but unlike that in some other recent instances. 20 9 The
fact of urban encirclement tends to be decisive for the process of rural-tourban transformation in a debtor-creditor context. As enacted in 1989,
the statute which defined the consequences of lack of municipal utilities
and fire and police protection warded off both municipal tax-assessors
and rapacious creditors by preserving the rural character of homesteads
when urban corporate boundaries encroached, 2 10 but enjoyment of those
advantages did not necessarily make the land urban for homestead purposes. Under the statutory amendments (contingent upon adoption of
the 1999 Texas constitutional amendment providing for the more extensive urban homestead), availability of those services within a municipality
makes the homestead urban, but lack of amenities allows the rural char21
acter of the homestead to be maintained. '
In In re Grisham,2 12 when a married couple bought the 80 acres in dispute, about 12 acres were within the municipal limits of the small town of
Mabank. The house, but not all the other buildings constructed on the
property, was within the boundaries of the town, and access to the house
204. 77 B.R. 580, 590 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987), affd, 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 960 (1992).
205. 960 F.2d 502, 508 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 971 (1993). Though in
Bradley the bankruptcy court found that the rich former farmland northeast of Dallas was
very prone to rapid urbanization, the Fifth Circuit court found that the failure of the municipality (in which the land was located) to provide municipal utilities and fire and police
protection under section 41.002(c) of the Property Code (as amended in 1989 and effective
through most of 1999) rebutted the assertion that the 129 acres in question had lost its rural
character.
206. 997 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042 (1994).
207. 138 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 1998).
208. 76 S.W. at 752.
209. See, e.g., instances cited in notes 204-06 supra.
210. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

211. See id.
212. 230 B.R. 529 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998),
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 1999).

affd, No. 3:99-CV-0346-P, 1999 WL 261849
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was by way of a town street. The town provided water and sewage, as
well as fire and police protection. Local private facilities also provided
other services. Though the couple used the property to raise livestock
and to grow hay, they were assessed and paid municipal taxes. The family
derived most of its support, however, from the husband's business activities. The residential area of the town was to the south of the couple's
property and a high school to the west, but the area to the east remained
undeveloped, with another school and an old residential area to the east
of that. To the north of the property, a state highway existed, with further
rural area to the north of that. The eighty acres thus abutted urban use
on the south and west, but such use was more removed on the east and
non-existent in the north's open country. The property was thus not
wholly surrounded by urban use when the couple filed for bankruptcy
relief. In concluding that the couple was merely entitled to an urban
homestead of one acre, the court seemingly put inordinate weight on the
fact that the municipal boundary encompassed the area including the
house and other buildings. This misplaced emphasis is even more apparent in light of the court's observation that the provision of the Property
Code that "[a] homestead is considered to be rural if, at the time the
designation is made, the property is not served by municipal utilities and
fire and police protection" is irrelevant if the amenities were available
when the property was so designated. 21 3 Notably, the legislative history
of this provision shows that its initial enactment related to municipal
property taxes rather than to a concern for creditor's claims to homestead
property.
In In re Kang21 4 a bankruptcy court considered the extent of a business
homestead. The bankruptcy debtor in a Chapter 13 case owned a small
strip-shopping-center in the middle of which he operated a grocery-convenience store. Asserting that he had purchased the entire shoppingcenter to protect the location of his business, he claimed the entire center
as his business homestead. 215 The total area allowed as an urban homestead was one acre when the bankruptcy was filed in 1998. Though a
tourist camp with twenty cabins alongside a gasoline station has qualified
as a business homestead for exemption purposes, 21 6 a grocery-convenience store, the court said, requires no more for its operation than the
213. Grisham, 230 B.R. at 531 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon

Supp. 2000).
214. 243 B.R. 666, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).

215. The dimensions of the center, however, were not mentioned. The debtor presumably claimed a residential homestead in the same urban area in which the business homestead was located. A business homestead can be claimed in an urban area where the
claimant lives, and in order to claim the business homestead the residential homestead
property need not be held in fee. See Ayres v. Patton, 111 S.W. 1079, 1082 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1908, no writ); Exall v. Security Mortgage & Trust Co., 39 S.W. 959, 960
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1897, writ ref'd).

216. See C.D. Shamburger Lumber Co. v. Delavan, 106 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1937, writ ref'd); Maroney Hardware Co. v. Connellee, 25 S.W. 448, 449
(Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1894, no writ) (lumber mill with a mill yard, camp houses, and

outhouses necessary for customers' lodging). As the dates of these decisions indicate, the
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"store with necessary space for ingress and egress and customer parking."'2 17 The court cast some doubt on the viability of such authorities as
Cooper Grocery Co. v. Peter21 8 and Brennan v. Fuller.2 19 Both of those
decisions, however, dealt with treating an entire building as a business
homestead when only a part of it is actually used for business purposes
and the rest is rented to others. There are analogous situations in which
an entire duplex or quadriplex has been treated as a residential homestead when only one unit of the building is actually occupied as a home
and the rest is occupied by others.220 The court suggested that in such
instances the extent of the homestead exemption must depend on the
space "reasonably necessary for the operation of [the] business. 2 21 With
the extension of the urban homestead to a possible ten acres, 22 2 grander
and more extensive business homestead claims may be anticipated.
Altogether consistent rules have not yet been developed for classifying
homes as urban or rural when they lie at the edge of an urban area surrounded by an acre or so of non-urban land. In In re Spencer22 3 a bankruptcy court concluded that one of a number of "ranchettes" should be
classified as urban because of its essentially urban use and location. Although the 1999 redefinition of urban homesteads to include up to ten
acres will preclude contests when under ten acres are claimed as exempt,
there is still some uncertainty about the proper formulation of a rule to
cover the extent of a rural homestead when the entire area is of up to two
hundred acres for a family (or one hundred acres for a single claimant)
and is of a rural character but is not used for the economic support of the
claimant but merely for the psychic gratification that a rural residence
may provide, as in In re Mitchell.2 24
urban homestead of the time was defined by land value at the time the homestead was
established.
217. Kang, 243 B.R. at 670.
218. 80 S.W. 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1904, writ ref'd).
219. 37 S.W. 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1896, no writ).
220. See Tyler v. Thomas, 297 S.W. 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1927), rev'd on other
grounds 6 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgm't adopted).
221. Kang, 243 B.R. at 670.
222. See TEX. CONsr. art. XVI, § 51 (amended 1999).
223. 109 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
224. 132 B.R. 553, 566 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991). See Leif M. Clark, Bankruptcy, Annual Survey of Fifth Circuit Law, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 441, 457 (1999); Joseph W. M
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1831,
1847-48 (1992); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161, 1174-75 (1994). In Mitchell the debtor-attorney maintained his office in his family home on 104 acres in a rural setting outside Bastrop. Although he had previously engaged in some farming and ranching there, he had abandoned
these activities. The court nevertheless allowed the claimant to maintain a homestead exemption for the entire area without proof that the property supported the claimant or his
family economically as prescribed in Autry v. Reasor, 102 Tex. 123, 108 S.W. 1162 (1908),
rev'd on reh'g, 113 S.W. 748 (1908). The Fifth Circuit Court's decision in Bradley seems
built on a point of view similar to that which prevailed in Mitchell. See Bradley, 960 F.2d at
507. See also In re McCain, 160 B.R. 933 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993), discussed in Joseph W.
M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV.
1161, 1174-75 (1994).
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In In re Brooks,225 the homestead claimant owned and operated a
ranch on 137 acres of rural land that had once been a part of a family
ranch comprising over 10,000 acres in Irion County. The rural property
was the only realty owned by the claimant, but he lived with his mother
on an adjacent property, which had been part of the former family ranch.
The claimant was a joint managing conservator of his two minor children
whom he had with him from time to time on the property claimed as a
homestead. He neither lived on the property claimed, however, nor had
made any preparation for building a house on the property beyond
merely giving the prospect of building some thought. Because he did not
occupy the property as his home, the bankruptcy court denied its exemption from his creditors' claims.226 If the bankrupt's living arrangements
with his mother on her adjacent ranch could have been characterized as a
leasehold interest (even possibly a tenancy-at-will), the bankrupt's interest in his 137 acres of ranching property might have retained its
227
exemption.
In In re Anderson228 a bankrupt soldier-debtor claimed a federal homestead exemption in South Carolina. Under military orders, the claimant
filed her bankruptcy petition in Texas after being transferred from her
home in South Carolina to a base in Texas. 229 Though the debtor lived in
Texas in a rented house, she continued to own her South Carolina home
(temporarily rented to a tenant) to which she intended to return. A creditor nevertheless argued that the South Carolina property had been abandoned as a homestead. With very little authority for guidance in
interpreting the federal provision, 230 the court concluded that South Carolina law allows a citizen to maintain a homestead interest when involuntarily compelled to be out of occupancy. 231 Texas authorities reach the
232
same conclusion.
Once a homestead right is established, a heavy burden rests on a contestant who asserts its abandonment. 233 In In re Estate of Casida2 34 the
executrix of the deceased surviving spouse of an apparently long marriage was unable to show that the spouse abandoned his homestead
though he spent many of his last years away, visiting his home only a few
times a year. The object of showing abandonment by the decedent in this
225. 233 B.R. 696, 698 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).
226. See id. at 701.
227. Cf. In re Eskew, 233 B.R. 708 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998), discussed in Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 52 SMU L. REV.

1143, 1167 (1999) (leasehold interest in farm and residence across the road, presumably on
property held in fee or as part of the leasehold).
228. 240 B.R. 254, 256 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999).
229. See 11 U.S.C.A. §522(d)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
230. The court gave several reasons why such authority is so limited. See Anderson, 240
B.R. at 258 n.3.
231. See id. at 258.
232. See Henderson v. Ford, 46 Tex. 627 (1877); Markley v. Barlow, 204 S.W. 1013, 1014
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, writ ref'd); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
233. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex. 1971).
234. 13 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.).
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instance was to deflect the claim of the decedent's unmarried adult son
who asserted a claim of homestead occupancy. Although Probate Code
section 271235 gives unmarried children living with the family a right to
assert the existence of a homestead that will repel creditors of the estate,
the claim will not prevail against co-heir's entitlement to a partition. 236
In addition to the homestead, Texas law has also long protected places
for burial as exempt from creditors' claims: "one or more lots used for a
place of burial of the dead," as provided in Property Code section
41.001(a), enacted in 1985 and reenacted in 1997.237 From 1875238 the
statutorily optional charter for towns with a population of over one thousand contained a provision exempting cemeteries from execution. In
1879239 an adaptation to the provision for the protection of burial lots was
added to the real property exemption statute where it has been since
maintained. The bankrupt single woman in In re Preston,2 4° claimed

"four burial plots" as exempt property under Texas law. The court apparently understood this to mean four burial lots rather than one lot with
four plots for burial. The trustee objected to exemption of more than one
plot. The language of the prior statute of 1973, reenacted in 1983, provided for "one or more lots held for use as a sepulcher of a family or a
single adult."'24 1 Though not intended as a change in the law, 242 the omission of the words "to be" before "used" in the "modernized" language of
the 1985 statute literally seems to limit a debtor's exemption to common
law protection of lots "already" used for burial. 243 The court stated in
Preston that the drafters of the 1985 act (as reenacted in 1997)
were clearly expanding for whom burial plots could be exempt by
eliminating the term 'family'.

. .

. Expanding the statute to allow for

this kind of exemption does not seem over broad or unreasonable.
However, to expand the statute any further and allow one to exempt
an unlimited amount of burial plots would clearly be contrary to the
intent of the drafters. The legislature had to have meant that one
could claim as exempt the number of burial plots that are reasonable
based on the facts and circumstances. 244
Rather than construing the 1985 and 1997 acts literally to protect only
lots "used for" a burial, the court supplied a test of exemption of burial
235. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 271 (Vernon Supp. 2000). See also Joseph W. MC
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 52 SMU L. REv.
1143, 1166 (1999).
236. See Casida, 13 S.W.3d at 523-24 (citing 18 M. K. WOODWARD & ERNEST F. SMITH,

II1, TEXAS PRACTICE: PROBATE & DECEDENTS' ESTATES § 868 (1971)).
237. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
238. See Act of March 1, 1875, 1875 Tex. Gen. Laws, §152 at 113.
239. See 1879 TEX. REV. STAT. art. 500, at 86.

240. 233 B.R. 375, 376 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999).
241. Act of June 15, 1973, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1627, ch. 588, § 2 (art. 3835) at 1628.
242. See Joseph W. MCKnight, Property Code Amendments, 1985 STATE BAR [OF
TEXAS] SECTION LE'rrER: FAMILY LAW 52, 53 (No. 2 1985); see also Joseph W. McKnight,

Texas Homestead Law, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1986).
243. Peterson v. Stolz, 269 S.W. 113, 115-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1925, writ

ref'd).

244. Preston, 233 B.R. at 377.
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places based on the reasonable need of the bankrupt-debtor. Such a test
was statutorily provided in 1985 for tools, implements, books, firearms,
clothing (including jewelry), and athletic and sporting equipment but was
repealed in 1991 because of the difficulty in fair application.2 45 Observing that the only relevant fact before the court was the debtor's failure to
list a dependant, the court found no need for more than one burial plot
and, instead, granted the debtor fifteen days to designate which "lot" she
would claim. 246 Thus, the court required the debtor to show a reasonable
need for the number of burial lots claimed as exempt property. In some
circumstances a single adult may reasonably need more than one burial
plot (as yet unused). The statute should be amended to clarify this point.
F.

SECURING LIABILITY ON A HOMESTEAD

The 1997 amendment to the Texas Constitution, article XVI, section 50
principally allows the fixing of a lien on a borrower's interest in homestead property for money borrowed for any purpose, a practice not previously allowed. The "home equity loan" was thus instituted along with
changes in provisions for a contractor's and a mechanic's lien on a homestead. The facts underlying the dispute in Rooms With a View, Inc. v.
Private National Mortgage Association, Inc. 247 occurred after the amendment became effective. Homeowners contracted with a home-builder for
homestead improvements, and a prospective lender indicated that it
would approve a secured loan for the work to be done. The contract
between the homeowners and the builder was signed at the office of
American Title Services, an abstract company. The amended constitutional provision, however, required the contract for work on a homestead
to be executed at (1) the lender's office, (2) an attorney's office, or (3) "a
title company." Both the builder and the homeowners believed that
American Title Services was "a title company, '2 48 but the lender thought
otherwise and declined to close the loan on that ground. The builder
sued the prospective lender seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997
amendment was void on various constitutional grounds, some of them not
considered as serious. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the amendment is not valid for vagueness with respect to
the reference to "a title company" as a place where a loan under the
amendment may be executed. Though the amendment lacks a definition
of the term, the term is well-understood in Texas caselaw as referring to a
title insurance company, often merely referred to as a title company.
Courts, however, generally distinguish between a company so described
245. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 1, 21-23 (1990); Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Family Exemption Laws, 21
TEX. TECH L. REV.

1121, 1145-46 (1990).

246. See Preston, 233 B.R. at 377.
247. 7 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied), petition for cert. filed, No. 992048 (June 19, 2000).
248. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (amended 1997).
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and one that makes title abstractions, that is one that "compiles data,
allowing an examiner to evaluate the title's legal status ....
A title insurer [however] guarantees the title's status and insures owners against
possible title defects. '249 The court noted that a bill passed at the same
legislative session as the constitutional amendment, dealing with liens
against homesteads, also defined the term "title company" as "a party
insuring title to property. '250 The court concluded that the term means
"a title insurer or an agent of a title insurer."'2 51 The court also rejected
the plaintiff's strained argument that the amendment interferes with a
corollary of a citizen's right to travel, that is, the "right to remain home"
or bring barred "from traveling to locations of their choosing, namely,
contractors' offices.125 2 The amendment, however, does not require that
the contract be entered into at a particular place. Several alternatives are
offered. The limited choices may seem absurd and without any necessary
relationship to the transaction, but the purpose of that particular provision was evidently to discourage such transactions and indeed to discourage approval of the amendment itself. One must remember that the
agreement was drawn under the very worst conditions: on the floor of the
legislative chamber with additions being offered by opponents of the
amendment who hoped that the voters would reject the cumulative mess.
Regrettably, they did not do so. 2 53 The plaintiff's merely oratorical argument that the amendment's provisions with respect to place of execution
was excessively paternalistic was also rejected.2 54
The plaintiff in Rooms With a View also failed to convince the court
that the provisions regarding execution violate the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause and federal statutory law (the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act). 255 The court also
rejected the argument that the brief explanation of the proposed amendment on the general election ballot of 1997 was inadequate in that it
failed to describe changes governing a mechanic's lien.2 5 6 The court also
noted that the plaintiff has failed to bring an election contest in this regard,25 7 but, in any event, the ballot description of the amendment met
the standard set by prior decisions.
In Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. 258 a homeowner asserted that the
builder who had constructed a new home for the owner on his homestead
property was entitled to a mechanic's lien on charges for the builder's
work and materials because the builder's contract did not comply with
249. Rooms, 7 S.W.3d at 846.

250. Id. at 846-47.
251. Id. at 847.
252. Id.
253. But if this scheme is to be a continuing part of our Constitution, a well-drawn
provision to replace the current one is overdue.
254. See Rooms, 7 S.W.3d at 847-48.
255. See id. at 848-50.
256. See id. at 850-51.
257. See id. at 850 n. 13.
258. 9 S.W.3d 473, 474 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. filed).
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the provisions of article XVI, section 50(a)(5)(A) to (D) of the Texas
Constitution. 25 9 By applying the last antecedent doctrine of construction
to the provisions of subsections (A) through (D) (which set out the formal requirements of the written contract) the court concluded that those
subsections apply only to contracts for "work and material used to repair
or renovate existing improvements" and not to contracts for "work and
material used in constructing new improvements." Looking to the meaning of "the language read as a whole" as that rule of construction requires, however, the two types of work and material joined in subsection
(5) by the word "or" seem to be intended to be read together. Thus, the
provisions of subsections (A) through (D) apply to both types of
contracts.
In In re Davis2 60 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
resolved the long-smoldering effort of an ex-wife to enforce a non-dischargeable family-support obligation on the homestead of her bankrupt
ex-husband and his present wife. 26 1 With three judges dissenting, the
court found that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Texas turnover
statute provides a means to enforce the obligation against the homestead. 262 The dissenting judges, on the other hand, concluded that a federal writ of execution for the prior support order would suffice as an
enforcement device. 263 If Congress should enact an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code whereby state homestead exemptions are eliminated
and replaced by a uniform federal homestead exemption, further consid2 64
eration of this question may be required.
G.

PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS

On the eve of their bankruptcy the debtor-couple whose case was
before the Bankruptcy Court in In re Coates265 used non-exempt assets to
259. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50:
(a) The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is
hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for:
(5) work and material used in constructing new improvements thereon, if
contracted for in writing, or work and material used to repair or renovate
existing improvements thereon if [certain formal requirements are met].
260. 170 F.3d 475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 67 (1999).
261. See In re Davis, 170 B.R. 892 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (decision by a divided
panel), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 48 SMU L. REV.

1225, 1273 (1995); In re Davis, 188 B.R. 544 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1995), discussed in Joseph
W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L.

REV. 1015, 1059-60 (1996); In re Davis, 105 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1997), a decision by a
divided panel of the court briefly discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1189, 1220-21 (1997).

262. See Davis, 170 F.3d at 483.
263. See id. at 493-94.
264. Current proposals with regard to uniformity in homestead exemptions seem to
focus on a $100,000 cap with a further proviso that it applies only to a homestead acquired
within a specific time (e.g. 2 years) prior to bankruptcy filing. See Leslie A. Shames, Calling a Fraud a Fraud: Why Congress Should Not Adopt a Uniform Cap on Homestead Exemptions, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 191, 200-01 (1999).
265. 242 B.R. 901 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
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discharge liens on their homestead and on exempt personalty. In response to their claims of Texas exemptions, their trustee in bankruptcy
interposed the provisions of Property Code section 42.004(a)2 66 to assert
a lien on that property in the amount of the liens discharged with nonexempt property in fraud of creditors. A denial of a discharge under
Bankruptcy Code section 727267 for these alleged frauds, however, was
not sought. The court merely concluded that the bankrupts used nonexempt funds with the intent to hinder and defraud their creditors as provided by section 42.004.268 Applying the statute to personalty only (as its
terms require), the court allowed the exemption of the homestead despite
the discharge of the lien,2 69 but granted the trustee a lien on the exempt
personalty for the amount of the liens discharged on the non-exempt
2 70
personalty.
In In re White2 7 1 the debtors claimed interest in certain computer
software as exempt personalty ("tools of the trade") under Property
Code section 42.002(a)(4).27 2 In the business of computer programming,
the debtors created and rented computer software to customers. Thus,
the court concluded that the computer software in issue was a product
and not a tool.2 73 As such it lacked exempt status under Texas law.
IV.

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A.

DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

1. Jurisdiction
In Reynolds v. Reynolds274 the husband and wife lived in Texas from
1981 until they separated in 1993. The husband then moved to Colorado
and then Vermont two years later. In the meantime, however, he sent his
wife money both to make mortgage payments on their home and to pay
for insurance on her car. The husband also continued to receive some
mail at their Texas home until 1995. The mortgage on the home was foreclosed in 1996. The wife then brought suit for divorce in Texas. The husband, through a Rule 120(a) special appearance,2 75 contested the
jurisdiction of the court to divide his military retirement benefits. Be266. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
267. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
268. See Coates, 242 B.R. at 905-06.
269. See id. at 906-07 (citing In re Reed, 12 B.R. 41 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
270. See Coates, 252 B.R. at 906.

271. 234 B.R. 388 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999).
272. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

273. See White, 234 B.R. at 389 (citing In re Erwin, 199 B.R. 628, 630 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1996)). In In re Legg, 164 B.R. 69, 73 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994), it is suggested that the term
"trade" as used in the statute can refer to self-employment as it obviously does. While the
debtors in White were employed by a business to which they licensed the use of the
software they designed, they were apparently also independent contractors of sorts.
274. 2 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
275. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
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cause the husband waived his reliance on federal law 276 by his failure to
plead the issue at trial, 277 and as the wife failed to bring her suit under
Family Code section 6.305(1) within two years of the husband's departure
from Texas, 27 8 the only issue on appeal was whether the wife could rely
on section 6.305(2) on general federal and Texas constitutional principles
of personal jurisdiction. 2 79 The husband did not question the court's
power to grant a divorce or to divide the property generally. Offering no
evidence to support his assertion, he merely argued that his appearance
in the Texas court to defend division of his military retirement benefits
would be excessively burdensome or inconvenient to him. The appellate
court nevertheless concluded that the wife sufficiently proved the two elements of jurisdiction over nonresidents under section 6.305(2): (1) minimum contacts between the husband and Texas existed and (2) traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice were upheld.
In Boots v. Lopez 280 the husband filed suit in Texas for divorce, divi-

sion of property, and custody and support of an infant child. Within a
month the wife filed a similar suit in Arizona, making a special appearance in the Texas case to contest the court's jurisdiction. Alleging that
she and the child had lived in Arizona for over six months, she argued1
28
that the Arizona court had exclusive jurisdiction over custody issues.
The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals upheld dismissal
under the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens because the
Arizona court had sole jurisdiction in the matter of custody, and property
in Arizona required division. Reference to Arizona realty, if any existed
would might be a significant factor in choosing the appropriate forum but
personalty was not a significant factor when Texas maintained personal
jurisdiction over both spouses. 282 Personal jurisdiction over the husband
of the Arizona court for the purpose of property division and support
issues was not discussed by the court.
2. Judge's Disqualificationor Recusal
In Peha v. Pefa283 the Corpus Christi appellate court provided a suc-

cinct explanation of the difference between the concepts of judicial disqualification and recusal with appropriate references to recent decisions
and other literature. 284 The wife alleged that the trial judge should have
276. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(4)

(West 1998). The federal provision preempts the minimum contacts basis of state-court
jurisdiction.
277. See TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
278. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.305(1) (Vernon 1998).
279. See id. at § 6.305(2).
280. 6 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
281. See id. at 294.
282. See id.
283. 986 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998), pet. denied, 8 S.W.3d 639
(Tex. 1999).
284. See In re Union Pac. Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1998); Monroe v. Blackmon, 946 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997), vacated, 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.
1998); McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,
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disqualified himself under the Texas Constitution 85 and Rules of Civil
Procedure2 8 6 because the attorney for the husband-father had a direct
pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation by
virtue of the fact that he represented the judge in an unrelated matter.
Because no specific interest was shown or even argued, the wife lacked
ground for disqualification. As to recusal, the wife's attorney waived objections by failing to urge the point before the trial court.
3.

Attorney's Disqualification

In In re Wallingford287 the husband sought to disqualify the wife's attorney in a divorce proceeding because the husband's attorney divulged
confidential information to a member of the wife's attorney's firm when
consulting on the case with another attorney in that firm. The attorney
allegedly receiving the information testified that he lacked recollection
despite discussing various cases with the husband's attorney. Because the
husband's attorney's statement to the contrary had not been given under
oath, the Austin Court of Appeals held he thus failed to support his mo88
tion with specific evidence. 2
4. Right to Counsel
In Smith v. Smith 289 the husband discharged his counsel two weeks
before the trial of his divorce case. After his motion for a continuance
was overruled, he proceeded pro se with advisory counsel. After the first
day of the two-day trial, however, the court forbade further advisory assistance of counsel. While the majority of the appellate court found no
constitutional deprivation of counsel, Justice Hudson perceived that the
husband's right to retain counsel under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend290
ments of the United States Constitution had been infringed.
5.

Right to Trial by Jury

In In re Richards291 the Amarillo appellate court rejected the wife-respondent's argument that the district court had denied her right of trial
by jury. Although she was clearly entitled to trial by jury by both the
Texas Constitution 292 and statute, 2 93 denial of a jury trial was proper
writ denied); William Wayne Kilgarlin and Jennifer Bruch, Disqualificationand Recusal of
Judges, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 599 (1986).
285. TEX. CONST. art. V., § 11.
286. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
287. No. 03-99-00761-CV, 1999 WL 1186804 (Tex. App.-Austin, November 24, 1999)
(not designated for publication).
288. See id. at *2 (citing Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997)).
289. 22 S.W.3d 140, 150-53 (majority opinion), 155-56 (concurrence by Hudson, J.)
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet).
290. See id. at *17 (citing Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 333 U.S. 1, 7
(1964)).
291. 991 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. disms'd).
292. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; art. V, § 10.
293. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.703 (Vernon 1998).
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when she had chosen not to introduce any evidence to controvert her
husband's testimony as to his ground for divorce. The only evidence
in a
before the court established the facts without controverting assertion
294
situation warranting a directed verdict in the presence of a jury.
At the 1999 legislative session, provisions were enacted for jury trial
of a visiting associate
before associate judges 295 and for the appointment 296
judge in the case of absence of an associate judge.
6. Appointment of Receiver
In Rusk v. Rusk, 29 7 during final arguments, the trial court had entertained a trial amendment to allow a request for the appointment 298 of a
receiver of community property. The appellate court held that allowing
the amendment was improper in that it prejudicially reshaped the husband's conduct of the trial299 and the property of which the receiver took
control was not community property but the husband's separate propthese points with
erty. 300 The appellate court was nonetheless divided on 301
one judge adhering closely to the trial court's position.
7. Statutory Pleading and Conduct of Trial
In two cases before the Family Court of Lubbock County and thereafter in the Amarillo Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of statutory
pleading rules was addressed. In In re Richards,30 2 the husband's petition
for divorce alleged the ground of insupportability in the brief general
terms of the statute. 30 3 The wife excepted specially on the ground that
further facts were necessary to prepare a proper defense. The judge overruled her exception saying that "there is no defense to a no fault divorce. '30 4 The appellate court made it plain that the trial judge's
294. See Richards, 991 S.W.2d. at 36-38.

295. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

296. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§§ 201.001, 201.003-201.005 (Vernon Supp.'2000). See

Stewart W. Gagnon, The Last Great Family Law Legislative Update of the Millennium, 62
TEX. B. J. 828, 831 (1999).

§ 201.018 (Vernon Supp. 2000). See Gagnon, supra

note 296, at 831.
297. 5 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
298. See id. at 306.
299. See id. at 305-07 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.001 (Vernon
1997), and Readhimer v. Readhimer, 728 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, no writ)).
300. With respect to a motion for a trial amendment during trial under TEX. R. Civ. P.
66, see Weynand v. Weynand, 990 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet denied.).
See also Jenkins v. Jenkins, 991 S.W.2d 440, 448-49 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet.
denied).
301. See Rusk, 5 S.W.2d at 312-14 (relying on the argument of voluntary divestiture of
title to separate property rejected in Haggen v. Pemelton, 836 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1992)).
Cf.Joseph W. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L. J.
413, 446-47 (1976).
302. 991 S.W. 2d 32 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. dismis'd).
303. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1998).
304. Richards, 991 S.W.2d at 34.
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comment was erroneous, 30 5 but in response to the wife's further assertion
that the provisions of section 6.402 and the consequent ruling on her special exception denied her equal protection of the laws, the appellate court
concluded that the trial court's ruling was proper. 30 6 Section 6.402(b)
provides that a spouse in a divorce proceeding cannot except specially to
the pleadings of the other spouse with respect to grounds for divorce
stated in the general terms of the statute. The petitioner's burden of
proof with respect to the facts necessary to establish insupportability as
defined in the statute. 30 7 She could have relied on discovery (as she actually did), but she did not request a hearing on any of her husband's objections thereto. To a motion for summary judgment adduced on the facts,
she had thus failed to support the grounds asserted. 30
In In re Spiege30 9 the respondent-husband requested on constitutional
grounds that the court enjoin the petitioner from invoking the provisions
of both section 6.402(b) and section 6.008(a), abolishing the defense of
recrimination. Following the hearing on the husband's motion, the court
denied relief on each application by a separate order saying "the specific
reason of the court's decision is: on record." The husband then filed a
notice of appeal and designation of the clerk's record but expressly stated
that he would not request a reporter's record. 310 Thus, the record before
the appellate court lacked a reporter's transcription of the record. The
appellate court therefore found nothing in the record explaining the trial
court's ruling. Because constitutional arguments should be avoided if a
dispute might be otherwise resolved, reliance was placed on other
grounds. 3 11 Those grounds should be deemed supported by the evidence
in the absence of a contrary showing in the record. Here the appellate
court deemed the trial court's holding supported by the evidence before
it.312 The court also noted that the new rules on appellate procedure
31 3
have not changed the law in this respect.
8. Notice of Final Hearing
In Platt v. Platt,3 14 after the wife answered the husband's petition for
divorce giving a new address, the court nevertheless sent her a notice of
final hearing at the address at which she was originally served. The wife
failed to appear at the hearing and the trial court entered a final decree.
305. See id. at 37 (citing Cusack v. Cusack, 491 S.W.2d 714, 716-17 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ dism'd.)). See Joseph W. M'Knight, Commentary to Title
of the Texas Family Code, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 911, 988 (1990) (§ 3.53 is now TEX. FAM.
CoiE ANN. § 6.701 (Vernon 1998)).
306. See id. at 35-36.
307. See Richards, 991 S.W.2d at 37-38.
308. See id. at 36.
309. 6 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
310. See id. at 645.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 646 (citing Bryant v. United Shortline, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex.
1998)).
313. See id. at 646.
314. 991 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.).
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The wife filed a timely motion for a new trial, but the court failed to hear
the motion until more than seventy-five days after entry of the judgment
had elapsed. No further action was taken because her motion had been
overruled by operation of law. After the wife filed a timely motion to
vacate the judgment and to reconsider her motion for a new trial, the trial
court overruled those motions within the time when it still had a plenary
power over the matter. The Tyler Court of Appeals held that the presumption of receipt of the mailed notice of final hearing was rebutted by
her affidavit of non-receipt. 3 15 The appellate court stated that the notice
of final hearing was mailed to the wrong address, 316 that is, to an address
different from that given by the respondent in her answer, and that the
trial court's notice of final hearing failed to comply with Rule 245317 in
the day set for final hearing rather
that it was mailed only a week before
318
than forty-five days as required.
9. Prisoner'sRights To Be Heard
Two cases dealt with rights of prisoners as respondents in marital disputes. In Zuniga v. Zuniga3 19 the husband who had been sued for divorce sought a bench warrant to order his appearance at the trial and
appointment of counsel to assist him. Though the court was aware of the
respondent's filing some sort of response, the court evidently overlooked
his requests, granted a divorce to the wife, and provided for the husband
a right of visitation with their child. Thereafter, the respondent again requested a right of appearance and appointment of counsel, followed by a
notice of appeal in a form that was construed as a motion for a new
trial. 320 The majority of the court found the trial court remiss in failing to
elicit any sort of testimony from the prisoner.
In Dodd v. Dodd321 a woman brought suit against her alleged husband
for a declaration that their bigamous marriage was void. 322 The respondent, who was then a prisoner, admitted that he had been married to
another woman, that he had filed suit against his first wife for divorce
prior to his marriage to the petitioner, and that his suit had been dismissed for want of prosecution after his marriage to the petitioner. He
sought a bench warrant for his appearance at the hearing but his request
was denied. Thereafter, the court declared the marriage void, awarded
the petitioner a trailer home (principally paid for with her funds) to the
petitioner, and awarded the rest of the property of both parties to the
315. See id. at 484. The appellant's affidavit was presumably filed with her motion for
new trial but that fact is not noted in the opinion.
316. See id.
317. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.

318. See Platt, 991 S.W.2d at 484.
319. 13 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
320. See id. at 802-03. Angelini, J., dissenting at 804-05, expressed the opinion that the
prisoner's notice of appeal could not be construed as a motion for new trial under TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 132.001 et seq. (Vernon 1997).
321. 17 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
322. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.202 (Vernon 1998).
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possessor. The respondent appealed. Again, the appellate court found
that the trial court had committed error in not providing a means by
which the prisoner could be heard. In this instance the respondent
claimed that the trailer home was his separate property, and the petitioner evidently conceded that he had made some contribution to its
purchase. But because the marriage was void, the court had no power to
divide the accumulated assets equitably between the parties. Insofar as
there were assets in which each party had a property interest, a partition
should have been ordered.
B.

MAKING THE DIVISION

1. Property Settlement Agreements
In reliance on section 7.006,323 divorce courts commonly urge parties to
reach a settlement on the division of their property. Such settlement
agreements may be in writing as provided by statute 324 or entered into in
open court and entered of record under Rule 11.325 Both parties must
join in such an agreement and one may withdraw from it prior to judgment, 326 but neither party may withdraw from the agreement effectively
after judgment. 327 Such an agreement in aid of divorce often takes the
form of an agreed judgment, and though subject to reformation for mutual mistake, 328 a unilateral mistake cannot be the basis for
329
reformation.
In In re Murray330 at trial the husband proposed in writing that realty
acquired by him and his wife in equal shares prior to their marriage be
awarded to the wife and that he be awarded a money judgment for the
value of his share. The trial court thereupon awarded the property to the
wife but did not comply with the husband's condition that he be awarded
a compensatory money judgment. Thus, the Texarkana appellate court
concluded that the husband could not be estopped by his33 1agreement because it was conditional and the condition was not met.
In Jenkins v. Jenkins332 a claim based on a property settlement agreement was considered in an unusual post-divorce context. As agreed in
writing by the parties, the divorce decree of 1992 provided for contractual
323. TEx.

FAM. CODE ANN.

324. See id.

§ 7.006 (Vernon 1998).

325. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
326. See TEX. FAM. CoE ANN. § 7.006(a) (Vernon 1998).
327. See Guyot v. Guyot, 3 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); Becker v.
Becker, 997 S.W.2d 394, 395-96 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.).
328. See Weynand v. Weynand, 990 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet.
denied).
329. See id. See also Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women's Freedom to Contractat Divorce:
A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153 (1999). The principal thesis of this
study is that the process of entering into property settlement agreements should be very
carefully scrutinized for duress.
330. 15 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.)
331. See id. at 206.
332. 991 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
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alimony of $2,000 a month to be paid by the husband over a period of
twelve years, that is, a specific amount spread over a period of years. After the ex-husband failed to make payments under the decree, the ex-wife
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in 1993. In 1994 the ex-husband
filed a motion to clarify and enforce the decree, and in 1995 the ex-wife's
trustee in bankruptcy intervened in the ex-husband's proceeding in order
to enforce the agreement for contracted alimony incorporated in the decree. The case came to trial in early 1998. The appellate court sustained
the trial court's rejection of the ex-husband's argument that the trustee in
bankruptcy lacked standing or capacity to sue for alimony payments
other than those due within 180 days of the ex-wife's bankruptcy filing as
only those were part of the bankruptcy estate. On this issue the appellate
court held that the ex-husband had waived his objection because his motion was unverified under Rule 93.333 The court also rejected the ex-husband's argument that the trustee in bankruptcy was barred by the twoyears statute of limitation from asserting a claim to any alimony payments
due during the two years prior to his intervention under Family Code
section 9.003(b). 334 That provision, the appellate court held, is applicable
to enforce a division of (undivided) future property not in existence at
the time the divorce decree becomes final but not for non-payments of
money under a divorce decree for which the payee may seek a money
335
judgment for enforcement.
2.

Abuse of Discretion

It is rare that an appellate court will find that a trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in the exercise of its good judgment in dividing
property on divorce. This point is amply illustrated in Frommer v. From3 8
337
mer,336 Vandiver v. Vandiver, and Pletcher v. Goetz. M
3.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The El Paso Court of Appeals took a different tack in Roberts v. Roberts.339 After having twice returned the case to the trial court for filing
findings of fact and conclusions of law, 340 the court finally reversed the
division of property and remanded the case for redivision of the property.
333. See id. at 444-45 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(2)).
334. See id. at 445-46; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.003(b) (Vernon 1998).

335. See id. (relying on Bowden v. Knowlton, 734 S.W.2d 206, 207-08 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), and rejecting the holding in Gonzales v. Gonzales,
728 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ)).
336. 981 S.W.2d 811, 814-15 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd).

337. 4 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
338. 9 S.W.3d 442, 446-47 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (citing Goetz v.
Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ) and Mogford v. Mogford,
616 S.W.2d 936, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

339. 999 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1999, no pet.).
340. See No. 08-97-00092-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso Jan. 8, 1998, no pet.); No. 08-9700092-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso July 2, 1998, no pet.) (both opinions not designated for
publication).
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At the close of the trial the judge granted a divorce to the parties and
divided the property in a manner seemingly in favor of the wife, who was
also ordered to pay significant debts but the court made no findings of
fact or conclusions of law, either as to the character of assets or their
value. At that point the judge went out of office and her successor entered a decree purportedly prepared in accordance with her findings. The
husband then filed his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law
under Rule 296. 34 1 The new judge declined to do so in light of his not
having heard the evidence and because some issues had been tried to a
jury. On the husband's appeal, the judge was ordered to make findings
and conclusions. Five weeks later the husband died. Thereafter the appellate court concluded that the husband's death did not render the appeal moot and extended the time for the trial judge to file his findings and
conclusions. The judge again indicated his inability to make findings.
The appellate court concluded that
the court must make findings on each material issue raised by the
pleadings and evidence, but not on evidentiary issues. Findings are
required only when they relate to ultimate or controlling issues....
Since jury findings as to both characterization and valuation of property are binding upon the trial court, findings of fact on those issues
should be available in a bench trial. . . . [T]he trial court does not
have to make findings listing the value of each item. Nor does it
have to list the factors which were considered in dividing the property because the factors to be considered are not issues of fact to be
determined by the trier of fact ....
It is difficult for us to see just
how a court of appeals can determine the fairness of the division
without findings
[made at the appellant's request] as to the values of
342
the assets.
The court went on to say that the failure of the trial court to file requested findings raises a presumption of harm unless the record demonstrates the contrary. 343 Because the judge was unable to make the
necessary findings, the case was reversed and remanded for a new division of the property. In its discussion of the problems involved, the court
noted unsuccessful efforts of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of
Texas to promote legislation requiring requested findings of fact and conclusions of law at the last two legislative sessions 344 and the present state
of the law under Rule 299a 345 adopted in 1990.346
4.

Consequences of Mischaracterization
In 1985 the Supreme Court of Texas, of which John Hill was then Chief

341.
342.
343.
(1944)).
344.
345.
346.

See TEX. R. CIv. PROC. 296.
Roberts, 999 S.W.2d at 434 (citations and footnotes omitted).
See id. at 436 (citing Wagner v. Riske, 142 Tex. 337, 442, 178 S.W.2d 117, 119
See id. at 435.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 299a.
See Roberts, 999 S.W.2d at 440-41.
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Justice, laid down the rule in Jacobs v. Jacobs347 that if an appellate court
finds that the trial court so mischaracterized marital property as to affect
be
materially the court's division of property, the entire division must
348 If
finding.
court's
appellate
the
of
light
in
court
trial
the
to
remanded
property is actually the separate property of one spouse and it is awarded
to the other spouse or it is divided between the spouses (as it was in Rusk
v. Rusk 349 and McCann v. McCann350 ), the reason underlying the rule is
readily apparent. But it is the function of the trial court, not the appellate
court, to divide the community estate on divorce. 35 1 Thus, the process of
remand inevitably entails further time and expense to the parties as a
consequence of the divorce court's error, and the result can motivate the
parties to compromise their dissatisfaction in the division to obviate that
loss of time and expense. In several instances prior to the enunciation of
the rule in Jacobs, appellate courts had merely let the division stand if the
separate property (mischaracterized as community property) was actually
divided in favor of its owner, but in those instances the trial court might
have made a different decision if ownership of all the property had been
properly ascertained. In Vandiver v. Vandiver 352 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals, speaking through John Hill (retired and sitting by assignment), found a way to avoid remand in an instance of mischaracterization of approximately $500,000 worth of the wife's separate property
as community property when it was nonetheless awarded to the wife. In
that instance, the trial court itself had stated that even if its questioned
characterization of the property was erroneous, its award of the property
was still "just and right" under the circumstances, that is, that whether the
property was properly characterized as community property or as the
wife's separate property, it would have been awarded to the wife. Bethe appellate court
cause the trial court itself made this determination,
353 In Evans v. Evans354
allowed the division to stand without remand.
where the trial court had mischaracterized community property as the
husband's separate property and had awarded it to him (though he had
his separate estate), a remand for redivinot even claimed the property as 355
sion was nevertheless necessary.
In Licata v. Licata356 the divorce court awarded the wife one-half of
any fees received by her lawyer-husband on any pending cases referred to
347. 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 38 (1986); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, 42 Sw. L.J. 1, 39-40 (1988).
348. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.'§ 7.001 (Vernon 1998).
349. 5 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
350. No. 14-97-01339-CV, 2000 WL 280301, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar.
16, 2000) (not designated for publication).
351. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 1998); McKnight v. McKnight, 534
S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976).
352. 4 S.W.3d 300, 303-05 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
353. See id. at 304-05.
354. 14 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
355. See id. at 347.
356. 11 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
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another lawyer and thirty percent of fees recovered on any other of his
pending cases up to a certain date that was about five months before the
decree was signed. The husband asserted that the award from his cases
included some of his future separate income because his rights to
amounts received might be for services rendered by him in trials of cases
after the date indicated. The appellate court agreed that the language of
the decree could include post-divorce income, but the record failed to
show that there were any actual pending cases. 357 The court also said that
because the husband challenged the award as an abuse of discretion, the
trial court (in this non-jury case with no findings of fact and conclusion of
law) had impliedly made all necessary findings in support of the
358
judgment.
5.

Temporary Alimony on Remand

In Herschberg v. Herschberg359 the ex-wife sought continuing temporary support on remand after her successful appeal of the divorce court's
property division, though the order granting the divorce was not appealed
and the former husband had remarried and with his new wife had filed a
petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court then ordered him to pay $5,000 each month out of the former community estate
to his former wife and had returned the matter to the divorce court for
further proceedings. The divorce court thereupon awarded the ex-wife
$8,000 each month in temporary support and $27,000 a month in attorney's fees. The ex-husband attacked both elements of the order by appeal and by a request for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court held
that the order (as an interlocutory order) was not appealable but granted
conditional relief by mandamus to vacate the order of the divorce court.
The Corpus Christi appeals court concluded that the divorce decree was
not final in that property of the couple had not been divided. 360 Thus, the
appeals court determined that the ruling sought by the ex-wife was for
temporary support "until a final decree is entered" as provided in Family
Code section 6.502361 and as such was an interlocutory order, which is not
appealable. The court nevertheless held that a writ of mandamus would
lie.

36 2

Paradoxically section 6.801363 nevertheless seems to imply that a divorce decree which is not subject to appeal is sufficiently final so that the
357. See id. at 278, citing TEX. R. App. P. 8.1(h) (brief must contain citations to record
to support contentions on appeal).
358. See id. at 279.
359. 994 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
360. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.502 (Vernon 1998); see also Herschberg at 277.
361. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.502 (Vernon 1998). Subject to waiver, as provided in
section 6.802, "neither party to a divorce may marry a third party before the 31st day after
the date the divorce is decreed."
362. See Herschberg, 994 S.W.2d at 279.
363. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.801 (Vernon 1998). See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to Title I of the Texas Family Code, 21 TEx. TECH L. REV. 911, 1029 (1990) (§3.66 was
recodified as §6.801 in 1997).
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parties are free to remarry someone else 364 though property division is

still before a court for determination. 365 But that section may be subject
to other interpretations.
C.

AWARD

OF

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The divorce court ordinarily awards attorney's fees in the exercise of its
good judgment as an integral part of the process of property division, 366
though there are other reasons (such as providing necessaries) that may
367
also support the award.
An award of attorney's fees on appeal is normally dependent on success of the appeal. In Weynand v. Weynand 368 on the wife's appeal the
appellate court remanded the case to the divorce court for division of
property in accordance with the parties' agreement incident to divorce
and the conclusions reached by the appellate court. On remand the trial
court awarded the husband's counsel up to $15,000 for pursuing further
appeals of the matter. The wife then appealed this and other issues. With
respect to the grant of prospective attorney's fees, the appellate court
held that the grant of fees not conditioned on the success of the appeal
369
was improper.
In Brown v. Fullenweider370 the parties to a suit for divorce entered
into an agreement incident to divorce in which the trial court ordered
that the parties "shall do all necessary acts to carry out the provisions of
the agreement. '371 The agreement provided that each party would be
responsible for his or her own attorney's fees, and a schedule was attached to the agreement providing that the husband would pay "all outstanding attorney fees and fees for other professionals incurred by [him]
in connection with this lawsuit. '3 72 Just over a year later a motion for
enforcement or clarification by the ex-husband's attorney sought judgment for his fees and those of others employed in connection with the
divorce. The trial court severed the attorney's claim from the divorce
case and docketed it under a new number. The trial court nonetheless
granted the attorney's motion for summary judgment for the fees
claimed, and the ex-husband appealed. Justice Hill (retired, sitting by
364. See Herschberg,994 S.W.2d at 276 (citing Galbraith v. Galbraith, 619 S.W.2d 238,
240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ); Underhill v. Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178, 181
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
365. In Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 328 (Tex. 1998), the court allowed the
divorce decree to stand but remanded matters of property division over which the court
lacked jurisdiction in circumstances now more precisely defined by statute in 1997. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.308 (Vernon 1998).
366. See Carte v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 SW.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
367. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 52 SMU L. REV. 1143,
1186-87 n. 326 (1999).
368. 990 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied).
369. See id. at 847 (citing Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988,
writ denied)).
370. 7 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. filed).
371. Id. at 335.
372. Id.
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assignment) spoke for the majority of the court in concluding that the
attorney was a party to the divorce proceeding for the purpose of claiming his attorney's fees. 373 The court's majority also held that fixing the

uncertain amount of fees owed by the ex-husband under the divorce decree amounted to a clarification and enforcement rather than a modification of the division of property in the decree. 374 It was apparently on the
basis of this procedural posture of the case that Justice Stoner dissented
on the ground that the attorney could not use this "vehicle to sue his own
client for attorney's fees in the divorce suit-the very action in which he is
'3 75
representing the client.
In Jenkins v. Jenkins376 the ex-husband (who had brought a post-divorce motion to clarify and enforce a divorce decree) complained on appeal that the trial court's award to the ex-wife for attorney's fees was
improper because she did not prevail on any of her claims. Relying on
Family Code section 9.014377 for the award of attorney's fees in cases for

enforcement of a divorce decree, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held
that "the court must state in the record or in its judgment the good cause
substantiating the award. ' 378 In another post-divorce dispute (a case to
divide property left undivided on divorce and to modify the decree) a
different panel of the same court pointed out in Pletcher v. Goetz 379 that

although section 9.205 specifically provides for such awards in cases involving division of undivided property, the court's power does not extend
to a motion to modify a divorce decree. 380
D.

BILL OF REVIEW

The grounds supporting an equitable bill of review are narrow and
strictly construed, 38 1 and failure to file a notice for a mistrial or to take an
appeal after judgment when such relief is available precludes the award
of a bill of review. 38 2 In Gone v. Gone383 the ex-husband who had failed
to respond to a petition for divorce in 1994, filed a petition for a bill of
review of the decree in 1997 alleging fraud of his ex-wife in procuring the
decree. The petitioner asserted that he was unaware of the decree when
373. See id. (citing John M. Gillis, P.C. v. Wilbur, 700 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.

App.-Dallas 1985, no writ)). For better support the court might have also cited Mullinax,
Wells, Mauzy & Collins, 478 S.W.2d 121,123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

374. See id. at 334-36.
375. Id. at 337. Though uncited, an opinion of the Texas Ethics Commission supports
this assertion in Op. Tex. Ethics Comm'n No. 2 (1974).
376. 991 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
377. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.014 (Vernon 1998) ("The court may award reasonable
attorney's fees as costs in a proceeding under this subchapter [for enforcement of a divorce
decree]"). See also Schneider v. Schneider, 5 S.W.3d 925, 930, 932 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999,
no pet.).
378. Jenkins, 991 S.W.2d at 450 (citing Marichal v. Marichal, 832 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
379. 9 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
380. See id. at 448.
381. See Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979).
382. See Williamson v. Williamson, 986 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.).
383. 993 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
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entered, that the couple were living together as husband and wife at the
time, and that four months later the couple bought a house as husband
and wife. He also alleged that he had not become aware of the decree
until he was served with an order of eviction from the former marital
home. The petitioner admitted that he had been served with a petition
for divorce but had not answered because his wife had told him not to
worry about divorce. 384 The respondent testified that she had not counseled her husband about the divorce, that he was in and out of the house,
that they fought a great deal, and that he drank heavily. The evidence
offered by both parties was conflicting, but the trial court sitting without a
jury found in favor of the ex-wife and concluded that the petitioner exhusband had failed to show a meritorious defense to the divorce and was
negligent in failing to file an answer. 385 The appellate court sustained this
conclusion, and the El Paso court responded similarly to another bill of
review in Williamson v. Williamson.386 In the latter case the fraud complained of was misrepresentation of the character of known community
property as separate property, a misrepresentation that constituted no
more than intrinsic fraud and hence was an insufficient ground for a bill
of review.
Chandler v. Chandler38 7 was the tenth instance of litigation between
the same parties in a series of disputes in Texas and federal courts that
have spanned almost twenty years. In the bill-of-review aspect of this
case, the petitioner ex-husband had sought a bill of review in 1983 to set
aside an agreed property settlement in a 1980 divorce and to redivide the
property. The petitioner's ground for his proceeding was that his wife
had fraudulently induced him to marry her while knowing that she was
married to someone else. The court noted, however, that the petitioner
had not sought a declaration that the marriage was void or that the decree of divorce was void. 388 In 1990 the court entered an order stating
that the petitioner had established a prima facie case of a meritorious
defense to the divorce, and the trial on the merits proceeded to a jury
trial in 1991. The jury found that the wife had not knowingly made a
fraudulent misrepresentation of her marital status prior to their marriage;
the court entered judgment against the petitioner and that judgment was
affirmed on appeal. 389 In 1994, however, the petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that the judgment in the bill of review litigation was void.
In 1997 the court entered a judgment that the petitioner's assertion was
384. At this point the case is reminiscent of Oliver v. Oliver, 889 S.W.2d 271, 272, 274
(Tex. 1994).
385. See Gone, 993 S.W.2d at 847. Cf. Ortmann v. Ortmann, 999 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (petitioner failed to show lack of negligence
on his own part, though he was apparently the victim of his attorney's dishonesty).
386. 986 S.W.2d at 381.
387. 991 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied), cert. denied, __

U.S.

__,

120 S. Ct. 1557 (2000).
388. See id. at 391.
389. Chandler v. Chandler, 842 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1992, writ denied).
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barred by the principle of res judicata. 390 The El Paso Court of Appeals
held that the petitioner had had an opportunity to declare his marriage
void in his prior bill of review proceeding and had failed to do so. Thus,
the court said, the bill of review had judgment become res judicata on
that issue.
E.

OTHER POST-DIVORCE CLAIMS

1. Jurisdiction
In Ackerly v Ackerly391 the divorce court ordered the husband to turn
over $13,000 in a savings account to his wife. After his failure to obey the
court order within two years, the ex-wife proceeded by motion in the
same court under the same cause number and with notice to the ex-husband's last known address (but without citation of the ex-husband) to
reduce that amount to a money judgment. The court granted the motion.
After receiving a copy of the order, the ex-husband appealed on the
ground of lack of service by citation. The appellate court held that a proceeding to reduce an order to a money judgment under Family Code section 9.010392 and its predecessor (though the language of the former
section was modestly different from that of the present section) is an original action, and the movant must proceed by service of citation.393 With394
out that process the judgment was void.
2.

Claim Barred by Limitation

The dispute in Chavez v. Chavez 395 grew out of a property division on
divorce in 1988. The divorce court divided certain shares of community
stock (then pledged as a security for a loan) between the spouses. The
court further ordered that the stock be sold after the loan (scheduled to
mature in 1990) was repaid and that the wife should receive one-half of
the proceeds. The husband, however, filed for bankruptcy after the divorce and was not discharged until 1994. He finally sold the stock in
May, 1996 but failed to deliver one-half of the proceeds to the ex-wife.
The ex-wife did not discover that the sale had occurred until April, 1997.
She filed a motion for contempt against the ex-husband for violation of
the order in October, 1998 and in February, 1999 filed a motion for enforcement. The court concluded that the wife had sought relief within the
two years statute of limitation which had not begun to run until the wife
discovered the facts in 1997.396
390. See Chandler, 991 S.W.2d at 378.
391. 13 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
392. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.010 (Vernon 1998).
393. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.001(c) (Vernon 1998).
394. See Ackerly, 13 S.W.3d at 458.
395. 12 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
396. See id. at 565.
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Pre-McCarty Military Retirement Benefits
In McCarty v. McCarty397 the United States Supreme Court held in

1981 that military retirement benefits were not subject to division in divorce cases. Congress responded in late 1982 (effective February 1, 1983)
by providing that such benefits are divisible under state law. In response
to the inclination of "some state courts [to be] less than faithful in their
adherence to the spirit of the [1982 Act]" ' 398 by which Congress put aside

the authority of McCarty for division of military retirement benefits, Congress made it plain in 1990 that such benefits left undivided on divorce
prior to the effective date of the McCarty decision are barred. Though in
Buys v. Buys 399 the court had found a residual provision in the decree
which disposed of the benefits, the court concluded in Havlen v. McDougall400 that in pre-McCarty cases when the benefits were not divided, the
Congressional act of 1990 is clearly applicable to preclude subsequent
division. Thus the dissent of Walker, C.J. in Walton v. Lee 40 1 was
vindicated.
4. Interpretation of Divorce Decrees
In Cecola v. Ruley402 the husband and wife owned two adjacent tracts
of land-a tract of eight acres and a narrow strip 40 feet wide and 280
feet long which connected the larger tract to a highway. Sometime during
the divorce proceeding the husband placed a railway boxcar across the
road through the narrow strip, and the road was thereby blocked. The
divorce court found that the larger tract was community property and
awarded it to the wife. The small, narrow tract was found to be a cotenancy of the husband and wife as the separate property of each. In the
divorce decree the narrow co-owned tract was described as "the easement" because of its apparent use as a means of reaching the larger community tract from the highway. After the divorce the ex-wife sold the
larger tract and her undivided interest in the smaller tract. The purchaser
brought suit to determine that the narrow tract constituted a right of way
to the larger tract. The court held that the reference to the narrow strip
as "the easement" did not amount to a finding of a dominant-servient
relationship between the two tracts that would benefit a subsequent purchaser of the ex-wife's interest in the larger tract. 40 3 "The court could not
confirm the existence of [a relationship] that did not exist. The court also
could not grant an express easement under [those] circumstances because
of the merger doctrine [by which any right of way that might have existed
397. 453 U.S. 210, 232 (1981).
398. H.R. REP. No. 665, at 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2931, 3005.
399. 924 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. 1996), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, 50 SMU L. REV. 1189, 1229-30 (1997).
400. 43 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 323, 2000 WL 19028 (Jan. 13, 2000).
401. 888 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied), discussed in Joseph
W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1237-38 (1995).
402. 12 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.)
403. See id. at 852.

1050

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

(though none was known to have existed) prior to acquisition by the
spouses would have been lost as a result of ownership of both tracts by
the same persons]. '40 4 After the purchaser acquired an undivided halfinterest in the strip, he had a right to use the whole of it along with his cotenant (the ex-husband) with the same right. The court went on to say
that the burden of proof was upon the ex-husband, who favored partition
by sale rather than partition in kind, to show that a partition in kind was
not possible and would not be fair. 40 5 The ex-husband was able to show
40 6
that a partition in kind was economically "unfeasible and impractical"
to him. The matter was therefore remanded to the trial court for further
consideration of the partition sought.
Another interpretative dispute arose in Milligan v. Niebuhr4 07-in that
instance the interpretation of a written contract of settlement on divorce. 40 8 In 1983 the future husband had acquired the Orchard tract with
the appurtenant right of way across Lot 13 to the riverfront tract also
owned by the future husband. In 1991 the future wife acquired Lot 13
subject to a true easement in favor of the Orchard tract. In 1992 the two
owners married. In their divorce in 1995 an agreed judgment was entered
by which each tract was returned to its prior owner. Thereafter the former wife closed the way between the Orchard tract and the riverfront
tract, and the former husband disputed her right to do so. The court concluded that the terms of the parties' contract of settlement unambiguously expressed their intent: that the wife was awarded "any and all
interest" in Lot 13 and the husband "is hereby divested of all right, title,
interest, and claim in and to such property." The husband was awarded
"any and all interest" in the Orchard tract and the wife was "divested of
all right, title, interest, and claim in and to" that property. There was no
mention of the easement. The terms of the decree further negated any
other agreements and specifically embraced the entire agreement of the
parties. 40 9 By their contract of settlement the husband therefore came
away from the marriage with less separate property than he had brought
into it.
5. Clarification and Enforcement
In Zeolla v. Zeolla4 10 the court held that the decree might be clarified
because it was incapable of being enforced by contempt. 4 1' That it was
not capable of such enforcement was certainly so, but the decree also
made no provision for the disposition of community retirement benefits
that were paid from the date of the ex-husband's early retirement to his
404. Id.

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See id. at 853-54.
Id. at 856.
990 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
See id. at 825.
See id. at 825-26.
15 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
See id. at 241 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.008(b) (Vernon 1998)).
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normal retirement date about eight years later. Rather than a motion to
clarify, the ex-wife should have brought suit under the procedures provided in Family Code section 9.203.412 The husband and wife had agreed
that the husband's community retirement benefits were payable to the
wife "if retirement occurs at age 65" and the decree so provided. At the
time the husband was 56. The ex-husband actually retired at age 57 and
began receiving retirement benefits of a lesser amount but did not share
them with his ex-wife. The ex-wife sought a clarification of the decree.
The ex-husband responded that the prior order was specific enough to be
enforced by contempt as provided in § 9.008(b) 413 and was therefore not
subject to clarification. The trial and appellate courts, however, concluded that the ex-husband's taking early retirement had produced a latent ambiguity in the agreement which the court had the power to clarify
and that the divorce court might thereupon adjust the terms of the decree
to reflect the consequences of the husband's early retirement. The court
also ordered that the ex-husband pay his ex-wife the benefits already received, though § 9.008(c) provides that "[t]he court may not give retroactive effect to a clarifying order." The appellate court concluded,
however, that this provision relates only to enforcement for contempt and
does not forbid such a clarifying order. The court's approach seems erroneous. Though the ex-husband's taking early retirement may have had
the effect of depleting the fund from which his retirement benefits were
to be paid, the agreement was fully capable of being complied with at age
65 and enforceable by contempt at that time. Thus, the ex-wife would
seem to be estopped from arguing that she was entitled to a clarification
of tie decree so that she would receive benefits prior to the husband's
projected retirement at age 65. At that time he was already required to
pay the full amount specified in the decree. As for the undisposed retirement benefits received by the husband between age 57 and age 65, the
wife's proper remedy was to proceed under section 9.203. If the ex-husband at age 65 would receive smaller benefits than those specified in the
decree, the fixing of benefits to be paid prior to that time might take that
fact into consideration.
The dispute in Schneider v. Schneider414 occurred after the divorced
couple had already modified their original divorce decree by agreement.
At the time of the divorce the husband had retired from the Air Force.
The divorce decree of 1994 had awarded the wife 31.9 percent of the husband's military disposable retired pay then being received by him and the
same percentage of the benefits under his Armed Service Survivor's Benefit Plan. Apparently, under the rules of the plan the husband was precluded from naming anyone else as beneficiary of the plan-annuity other
than the named ex-spouse, and the decree so stated. Under the divorce
decree the wife was required to pay 31.9 percent of the monthly premium
412.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.203 (Vernon 1998).

413. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.008(b) (Vernon 1998).
414. 5 S.W.3d 925 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
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to maintain the plan. Following the federal statute to that effect 415 (the
implication of which the parties were probably not cognizant at the time
of the divorce), the Air Force refused to limit the ex-wife's share of the
plan to 31.9 percent. The parties later perceived, however, that as long as
the position of the Air Force remained unchanged, the ex-wife would
take the whole of the plan-benefits if she survived the ex-husband. Thus,
in 1995 the parties agreed to a modification of the divorce decree, and the
modification was entered by the court. The modified order provided that
the ex-wife would pay the entire monthly premium on the plan until such
time as the Air Force recognized the 31.9 percent limit on her interest.
The modified decree also provided that the ex-husband would supply the
ex-wife with monthly evidence of the amounts deductible from his retired
pay as proof of the amounts she would owe him. For a while the ex-wife
reimbursed the ex-husband for the full amount of the premiums paid as
agreed, but she later reduced the amount by 31.9 percent to reflect her
view that she was entitled to a credit for the amount of the premium that
had been deducted from her portion of the ex-husband's monthly retirement pay. The ex-husband regarded these transactions as made contrary
to the modified decree (as they apparently were). In the meantime he
had evidently remarried, and he brought a suit for clarification of the
modified decree. In reliance upon Family Code section 9.011,416 which
seems designed to deal with somewhat different situations, the ex-husband sought to fix a constructive trust on the portion of the plan-benefits
not covered by the divorce decree so that his new wife might share in
those benefits. Sensing that the federal statute might control this issue by
preemption, the trial court denied that motion though it did not express
any opinion on federal preemption. The appellate court found no abuse
of discretion in denial of the motion in light of the preemption concern
and the fact that the Air Force might still accede to the terms of the de4 17
cree to limit the ex-wife's interest in the plan-benefits to 31.9 percent.
In response to the ex-husband's motion requesting that the decree be
clarified by an order that the ex-wife compensate the ex-husband for
amounts she had deducted on her own initiative contrary to the terms of
the modified order, the appellate court sustained the trial court's denial
of the ex-husband's motion on the ground that the ex-wife was (as she
argued) paying more than she should have agreed to pay,4 18 but the
415. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1448(b)(2)(B) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
416. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.011 (Vernon 1998):
Right to Future Property
(a) The court may, by any remedy provided by this chapter, enforce an
award of the right to receive installment payments or a lump-sum payment
due on the maturation of an existing vested or nonvested right to be paid in
the future.
(b) The subsequent actual receipt by the non-owning party of property
awarded to the owner in a decree of divorce or annulment creates a fiduciary
obligation in favor of the owner and imposes a constructive trust on the
property for the benefit of the owner.
417. See Schneider, 5 S.W.3d at 929-30.
418. See id. at 930-31.
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amount appeared to have been in accordance with the agreed modified
decree. The trial court also denied the motion of each party for attorney's fees 419 in that neither party had prevailed with respect to affirmative relief sought. The ex-wife sought sanctions for the ex-husband's
420
frivolous suit but failed to support her allegation.
Sanctions were the central issue, however, in Bradt v. Sebek, 421 an attorney's appeal from imposition of sanctions against him in a suit in
which he had represented an ex-husband who brought a suit against his
ex-wife and her attorney in the aftermath of a divorce proceeding. Sanctions were imposed against the ex-husband as well as the attorney.
Under the circumstances, which included filing groundless pleadings in
bad faith for the purpose of harassment, the appellate court concluded
422
that the sanctions imposed against the attorney were warranted.

419. See id. at 930 (ex-husband's motion), 932 (ex-wife's motion).
420. See id. at 932.
421. 14 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
422. See id. at 759; see also Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, writ denied), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 868 (1995); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied.).
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